Sentencing; Restitution; Whether the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA) authorizes the award of prejudgment interest; 18 USC § 3663A; United States v Qurashi (2d Cir); The “time value of money”; Interest calculation

The court agreed with the majority of the other circuits that have interpreted the MVRA and its predecessor statute to permit an award of prejudgment interest in calculating restitution when it more fully compensates the victim’s loss. It also concluded that the “district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that prejudgment interest more fully compensated” the victim’s (J.M.) losses. Defendant-Fike pled guilty to wire fraud and aggravated identity theft for defrauding J.M., a client. In addition to prison and supervised release terms, the district court ordered her to pay J.M. the amount Fike had taken, $363,657.67, plus $42,209.41 in prejudgment interest. Fike argued that the MVRA does not authorize prejudgment interest, and even if it did, the district court’s figures were too “speculative.” Although the court noted that no Sixth Circuit published case has held that the MVRA permits interest as part of restitution, it has “not categorically ruled” it out. And in an unpublished decision, it had found “that the MVRA does not exclude interest from a restitution award . . . .” Further, several other circuits have held that restitution under the MVRA may include prejudgment interest. The Second Circuit in Qurashi held that “the MVRA explicitly recognizes ‘that a victim’s losses may change in value between the date of the loss and the date of sentencing. . . . This change in value is commonly known as the time value of money[.]” The court concluded that the “MVRA gives district courts discretion to award prejudgment interest as part of restitution when that interest is necessary to make the victim whole. . . . This reading of the MVRA aligns not only with that of our sister circuits, but also with our longstanding approach to awarding interest in other contexts.” The MVRA’s silence on the issue was not dispositive because “[e]ven when a statute does not mandate an award of prejudgment interest, a district court can award it at its own discretion under general equitable principles.” The court also found that the district court offered a “sufficient rationale as to why the interest calculation presented a reliable basis for awarding interest.” Its decision to award interest when J.M. presented itemization, but not to award it “or additional restitution when she did not, shows that it exercised ‘some precision’ in reaching its conclusion.” After considering J.M.’s declaration and finding it “reliable, the district court did not need to elicit other evidence or subject J.M. to cross examination.” Affirmed.