Trip & fall on a metal stub paved into & protruding from a sidewalk; Governmental immunity; MCL 691.1407(1); The sidewalk exception; MCL 691.1402a; Municipalities’ affirmative duty to maintain public sidewalks in reasonable repair; Whether the metal stub was a “defect” or “dangerous condition” “in the sidewalk” for purposes of MCL 691.1402a(3); “Sidewalk” (MCL 691.1401(f)); Distinguishing LaMeau v Royal Oak

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court reversed Part II(B)(2) of the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 80450 in the 11/15/23 edition) and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. It held that the metal stub at issue in this case “was a sidewalk defect under MCL 691.1402a.” Plaintiff was walking on “the sidewalk when he tripped over a circular metal stub that was 5 inches high and 4 inches wide. The metal stub was paved into, and protruding from, the sidewalk.” The case asked the court to decide “whether the metal stub was a ‘defect’ or ‘dangerous condition’ ‘in the sidewalk’ for purposes of MCL 691.1402a(3). In short, the answer is yes. Because the stub measured 5 inches tall, it created a ‘vertical discontinuity defect of 2 inches or more.’” In addition, it was “embedded into the sidewalk’s concrete in the middle of the pedestrian pathway. Therefore, it created a ‘dangerous condition in the sidewalk itself.’” Defendant-city argued that MCL 691.1401(f)’s definition of a sidewalk “as a ‘paved public sidewalk’ limits its liability to defects in the sidewalk’s pavement. But the language the Legislature used in MCL 691.1402a(3)—'vertical discontinuity . . . in the sidewalk’ and ‘dangerous condition in the sidewalk itself’—does not limit its application to the pavement itself. The reference to ‘a paved public sidewalk’ in MCL 691.1401(f) merely serves to limit municipalities’ liability to paved public sidewalks, as opposed to unpaved or private sidewalks. This specific fact pattern distinguishes the present case from the precedent relied upon by the Court of Appeals majority and places the metal stub at issue squarely within the scope of MCL 691.1402a(3). The Court of Appeals majority erred by focusing its analysis on factually distinguishable precedents, rather than examining the statutory language to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s intent.” The court found that recognizing “this unique hazard as actionable under MCL 691.1402a(3) not only aligns with the Legislature’s intent to impose liability for sidewalk defects but also underscores the city’s failure to address a safety risk embedded in the middle of the pedestrian pathway.” The court added that this conclusion was consistent with its holding in LaMeau. The trial court correctly denied the city’s summary disposition motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7).

Concurring, Justice Welch wrote “separately only to say that the object at issue in this case, as shown in” an image included in the order, was “plainly a ‘defect in the sidewalk’ and certainly the type of hazard that the Legislature intended to guard against when it enacted MCL 691.1402a.”

Dissenting, Justice Zahra found that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the signpost stub “at issue was not part of the sidewalk itself, and therefore the sidewalk exception to governmental immunity” did not apply. He would deny leave to appeal because he agreed “with the Court of Appeals that defendant is entitled to summary disposition[.]”