Postjudgment motion for a new trial or a competency hearing; Distinguishing People v Lucas; Competency to stand trial; MCL 330.2022(1); Evidence of incompetency; People v Blocker; Bona fide doubt; People v Kammeraad; Right to be present; Waiver; Implicit waiver on account of disruptive behavior; Illinois v Allen; Harmless error; People v Buie; Right of confrontation; “Surrogate witness”; Life without the possibility of parole (LWOP)

Finding no errors requiring reversal, the court affirmed defendant’s conviction of first-degree murder and his sentence to LWOP. As an initial matter, it found that even if he had properly presented the issue of the trial court’s denial of his postjudgment motion for a new trial or a competency hearing on appeal, the trial court did not err by denying the motion. The court found this case was distinguishable from Lucas. Turning to the merits, it rejected his argument that the trial court erred when it declined to order a competency evaluation after his trial counsel made two requests during trial. “Because a reasonable judge could have concluded that there was not a bona fide doubt regarding defendant’s competence on the first day of trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to order a competency evaluation that day.” The trial court also “did not abuse its discretion by denying defense counsel’s renewed request for a competency evaluation. Notably, counsel did not divulge the content of his communications with his client, but rather, only disclosed that defendant was talking a lot and providing differing versions of events. Additionally, defendant was able to listen to and cogently answer the court’s questions. From this, it was reasonable for [it] to not have ‘experienced doubt with respect to [defendant’s] competency to stand trial.’” The court also rejected his claim that he was entitled to a new trial because his right to be present was violated when he was temporarily removed from the courtroom for “talking too much” during a witness’s testimony. Although he “was removed from the courtroom without a valid waiver (either an express one or an implicit one as described in Allen)” this error was harmless because his “absence inured to his benefit.” Defense counsel requested his “removal because defendant’s presence made it impossible for counsel to focus on the witness’s testimony and provide effective assistance.” In addition, this was “not a situation where defendant was absent for the entirety of trial or even a large portion of it.” And because “the jury heard why [he] was removed from the courtroom, his assertion” that he was prejudiced because it “was told that he was removed for ‘talking too much’” was meritless. Finally, the court rejected his contention that he was entitled to a new trial because his right to confrontation was violated through the use of a “surrogate witness.” The fact the witness “testified that defendant’s DNA was found on a single cigarette butt inside” a previous victim’s apartment was “merely cumulative to other unchallenged evidence that was admitted at trial.” As such, assuming there was any error as to this “testimony, it [was] evident that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Affirmed.