Sufficiency of the evidence; Felonious assault; MCL 750.82(1); People v Nix; Inferring intent from a defendant’s actions, not just his or her statements; People v Cameron; Principle that minimal circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish a defendant’s state of mind; People v Kanaan; Other acts of domestic violence; Prosecutorial error; People v Savage; Prejudice

Finding no errors requiring reversal, the court affirmed defendant’s conviction of felonious assault. The conviction arose out of an incident with his wife, J. On appeal, the court rejected his arguments that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because he did not have the intent to place J in reasonable fear of a battery; 2) the trial court abused its discretion by denying a mistrial after J repeatedly referred to alleged other acts of domestic violence; and 3) he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor improperly commented on his decision not to testify during closing argument. First, the “totality of defendant’s actions provides sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a jury could infer defendant intended to place [J] in reasonable fear of a battery.” His contention that “his ‘get you’ statement to [J] was insufficient to demonstrate he had the necessary intent to convict him of felonious assault discounts the context in which the statement was made.” And J’s “two-day delay in reporting the totality of defendant’s conduct to the police” was not grounds for vacating his conviction. Second, defendant “was not denied a fair trial by [J’s] testimony indirectly referencing inadmissible, alleged prior acts of domestic violence because the record demonstrates that the prosecutor did not intentionally elicit the reference to defendant’s prior alleged acts of domestic violence.” Nor did “the record suggest that the prosecutor knew in advance that [J] would give the unresponsive answers which indirectly referenced defendant’s alleged prior bad acts, or that the prosecutor conspired with or encouraged” J to so testify. Further, “the trial court instructed the jury to disregard [J’s] testimony that ‘this keeps happening’ because there was no evidence as to what conduct she referenced.” Third, when “viewed in context, the prosecutor’s rhetorical comment to the jury that [J’s] testimony was undisputed did not impermissibly attempt to shift the burden of proof to defendant. The prosecutor’s statement rebutted arguments made during defendant’s closing arguments.” Moreover, even “if the prosecutor’s remark prejudiced defendant, the trial court’s jury instructions cured any prejudice.” Affirmed.