Divorce; Property division; Collateral estoppel; Bryan v JPMorgan Chase Bank; Oral agreements; Postnuptial agreements; Wright v Wright; Statute of frauds; MCL 566.106; Partial performance; Barclae v Zarb

The court held that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition for plaintiff-ex-wife. The trial court entered a judgment of divorce awarding: “(1) the parties their respective bank accounts, vehicles, and debts; and (2) plaintiff the Torch Lake property, the remaining proceeds from the sale of the Battle Creek property, and the parties’ joint bank account.” On appeal, the court agreed with defendant-ex-husband that the trial court erred by applying collateral estoppel to the parties’ claims when granting plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition. “Even though this case was initiated in Barry County before proceeding in Antrim County, there is no evidence that: (1) the parties had an opportunity to litigate these issues in Barry County, or (2) the Barry County proceedings resulted in a valid and final” judgment. The court also agreed with defendant that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition for plaintiff because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of any alleged oral agreements between the parties. When viewing the “competing evidence in the light most favorable to defendant, reasonable minds could differ as to whether the parties entered into the alleged oral postnuptial agreement.” And even “though defendant violated the restraining order, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the parties entered into the alleged final settlement agreement[.]” Finally, the court agreed with defendant that even assuming “that the alleged oral agreements existed, they would not be enforceable because they are against public policy and contrary to the statute of frauds.” Even if “the parties did enter into this alleged oral postnuptial agreement, it would be invalidated on the basis that it encouraged divorce by making it financially attractive for plaintiff to divorce defendant.” And because plaintiff “failed to show that either oral contract existed by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court could not apply the doctrine of partial performance to the alleged agreements.” As such, “even if the alleged oral agreements existed, they would not be enforceable because they are against public policy and contrary to the statute of frauds.” Vacated and remanded.