Retaliation claim under Michigan’s Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); MCL 37.2201(a); Miller v Department of Corrs; “Person” under MCL 37.2103(h); Whether corporations may assert claims of retaliation; MCL 37.2801(1); InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA v Board of Governors of Wayne State Univ (ED MI); “Employer”; “Individual”; ELCRA’s antiretaliation provision; Protected activity

The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendants’ motions to dismiss plaintiff’s retaliation claim under the ELCRA. Plaintiff claimed defendants’ termination of their business relationship was retaliatory under the ELCRA because it followed plaintiff’s opposition to their alleged discriminatory behavior. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred by requiring that, to survive a motion to dismiss its retaliation claim, it had to establish that defendants either had an employment relationship with plaintiff or be a place of public accommodation. The court agreed with the trial court. The “law recognizes that defendants potentially could retaliate under the ELCRA without being plaintiff’s employer. The question, though, is whether either defendant could discriminate against plaintiff without being plaintiff’s employer, such that the opposed conduct constituted a requisite violation of the ELCRA.” The court found that “plaintiff adequately alleged that, although neither defendant is plaintiff’s employer, each defendant is an employer under the ELCRA.” However, plaintiff “is not an ‘individual.’” And the “use of the word ‘individual’ in the context of MCL 37.2202(1)(a) precludes the type of alleged business-to-business discrimination opposed here by plaintiff.” The court concluded “‘an employer can be held liable under the [EL]CRA for discriminatory acts against a nonemployee if the nonemployee can demonstrate that the employer affected or controlled a term, condition, or privilege of the nonemployee’s employment.’” There were no allegations that one of the defendants, as a customer of plaintiff, or the other defendant, as a contractor with plaintiff, affected or controlled the work status of plaintiff’s owner. Even if the court interpreted “the complaint as asserting a third-party retaliation claim, there still [was] no underlying protected act.” Affirmed.