Jury selection; Challenges for cause; MCR 2.511(E)(10); Reaffirming People v Eccles; Juror criteria; MCL 600.1307a(1); Bias; Effect of a prospective juror’s involvement in litigation with a party in the present proceeding; Effect of a prospective juror’s being accused of a criminal offense; People v Raisanen; Peremptory challenges; Waiver; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Sentencing; Habitual offender enhancement; People v Bonilla-Machado

Finding no errors requiring reversal, the court affirmed defendant’s conviction of delivery of meth and sentence of 36 months to 30 years. His conviction arose out of his sale of meth to an undercover officer and an informant. The court rejected his argument that the trial court erred when it granted the prosecution’s challenges for cause of two prospective jurors. “Defense counsel, who had notice of the prosecution’s intent to challenge these jurors” based on MCR 2.511(E)(10), “waived the issue at trial by affirmatively stating that she had no objection to the excusal of these jurors.” The court also reaffirmed Eccles, noting it “was well-reasoned and conforms to the plain language of the court rule.” Because the “court rule does not implicate the general qualifications to serve on a jury, it does not conflict with MCL 600.1307a(1).” And contrary to defendant’s assertion, a “prospective juror must have been ‘accused by’ the same prosecutor’s office involved in the present case” to be challenged for cause under this rule. Further, “the Eccles Court’s construction of MCR 2.511(E)(10)” was not “ambiguous in a manner that improperly modifie[d] the common law of this state.” Moreover, defendant did not establish “the Eccles decision violates” due process. “From this record, we can conclude that both Jurors 25 and 32 were accused of crimes by the” prosecutor’s office involved in this case. “After the prosecution challenged these jurors for cause, the trial court was required to exclude them. Because the trial court, which was bound to apply Eccles,” properly excluded the two jurors, there was no error. In any event, “[h]ad Jurors 25 and 32 not been excused for cause, the prosecution was not prevented from validly excluding them using peremptory challenges.” Defendant also could not “show that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Finally, the court rejected his contention that his maximum sentence was invalid because the trial court failed to articulate on the record that it had discretion when imposing the enhancement. “Because the trial court was not required to articulate on the record that it had discretion to impose a lower maximum sentence and defendant points to no other evidence that [it] did not recognize its discretion, defendant has not overcome the presumption that the trial court knows the law.”