Retaliation claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA); Vicarious liability; Prima facie case; Whether defendant-former employer established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s discharge; Pretext; Whether plaintiff was “singled out for adverse treatment”; Hubbell v FedEx SmartPost, Inc; Whether a biased supervisor’s motives could be imputed to the decisionmakers who fired plaintiff; Proximate causation

The court held that plaintiff-Gray established her prima facie claim of ADA retaliation and presented enough evidence to show that a supervisor’s (defendant-Kyle) “stated reason for reporting her” for alleged timecard irregularities “was a pretext designed to mask retaliation.” Further, she supported her vicarious liability theory against defendant-former employer (State Farm) with “enough evidence to show that Kyle proximately caused her termination” even though he was not among those who made the decision to discharge her. Gray helped a fellow employee receive an ADA accommodation, contrary to the wishes of Kyle, the colleague’s supervisor. A few months later, Kyle “reported Gray for timecard falsification. State Farm investigated the report and fired Gray.” She then brought this suit, alleging that Kyle “singled her out for conduct widespread in the agency” for assisting her colleague in securing the accommodation. The district court granted State Farm summary judgment. On appeal, the court concluded Gray could “proceed on a theory of vicarious liability based on the supervisor’s alleged bias.” It noted that vicarious liability, also “known as ‘cat’s paw’ liability, hinges on a neutral decisionmaker acting on a biased subordinate’s input.” Kyle was the subordinate here. The court held that Gray established her prima facie case. Her support for her colleague during the colleague’s ADA process qualified as “protected activity” and she offered “evidence that Kyle and others knew about her involvement.” She also established the causation element where she showed that she had undergone increased scrutiny after she helped the colleague, which led to a broader inquiry resulting in her termination. The court noted the temporal proximity (only two or three months) between the time Gray assisted the colleague and the investigation that led to her discharge. As to the issues of pretext and vicarious liability, the court held that Gray offered sufficient “evidence of differential scrutiny to raise a material dispute over Kyle’s motives.” There was evidence that despite “knowing about their similar conduct, Kyle did not treat” another employee (P) “and Gray in the same way.” Further, the court noted the “heightened scrutiny seemed to come only after Gray engaged in protected activity, with no other prevailing reason to justify it.” Turning to the issue of causal nexus for purposes of the vicarious liability claim against State Farm, “Kyle reported Gray for conduct that was ‘virtually identical’ to” P’s, and a jury “could conclude that State Farm relied on Kyle’s ‘biased report’ when it chose to investigate and ultimately terminate Gray.” Reversed and remanded.