Divorce; Compliance with remand orders; Glenn v TPI Petroleum, Inc; Modification of spousal support; MCL 552.28; Berger v Berger; New facts or changed circumstances; Luckow Estate v Luckow; A referee’s authority; MCL 552.507(2)(a); Harmless error; Due process; Retroactive modification of spousal support; The law-of-the-case doctrine; Rott v Rott; Attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D)

The court held that the trial court did not err by reducing the amount of monthly spousal support payable by plaintiff-ex-husband, or by denying defendant-ex-wife’s request for attorney fees. In a prior appeal, it vacated and remanded for the trial court to consider defendant’s request for attorney fees and explain how its reduction in spousal support was tied to its analysis of the Berger factors and how it was an equitable result. On remand, the trial court again found that a reduction in spousal support was equitable, and again denied defendant’s request for attorney fees. In the present appeal, the court rejected defendant’s argument that the trial court failed to comply with its remand order. It noted the trial court reiterated its “directives in its written opinion and order on remand and, contrary to defendant’s assertions on appeal, thoroughly addressed each of the issues on remand as directed.” As to attorney fees, it “duly explained why it believed that defendant was not entitled” to her requested fees. As to spousal support, it “expressly clarified how its reduction in support connected to its analysis of the Berger factors and why that reduction was equitable in light of that analysis.” And as to retroactive modification of spousal support, the trial court noted that the court concluded such modification “was inequitable given that defendant did not begin working a full-time job until [9/20], so [it] ordered ‘that the modification be retroactively applied to [9/1/20], when [she] first began working full-time.’” The court also rejected her direct challenges to the spousal support reduction. “In reviewing Berger factor 14 and general principles of equity,” it saw “no reversible error in the trial court’s conclusion that a reduction in spousal support” was equitable given the circumstances of this case. In addition, she failed to show how any error as to the referee’s role was not harmless. Further, defendant “was afforded ample notice and opportunity to be heard . . . including on remand, and . . . failed to show how she was nonetheless denied her” right to due process. The court next rejected plaintiff’s claim on cross appeal that the trial court erred by retroactively reducing the spousal support to 9/1/20, rather than to 2/1/20. While he clearly disagreed with the court’s “prior determination, plaintiff has offered, and we see, no colorable basis for disregarding the law-of-the-case doctrine here.” Finally, the court rejected defendant’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion by finding she was not entitled to attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D). She failed to show that decision “was outside the range of” reasonable and principled outcomes. Affirmed.