Sua sponte entry of an order of acquittal after a jury guilty verdict; Motions for a directed verdict of acquittal; MCR 6.419; Court rule interpretation; People v Owens; People v McEwan; Distinguishing People v Lemmon

Holding that the trial “court did not have authority under the court rules to sua sponte grant a directed verdict of acquittal after the jury returned its guilty verdict[,]” the court reversed the order of acquittal and remanded. The jury found defendant guilty of CCW. The court noted that motions for a directed verdict of acquittal are governed by MCR 6.419. It concluded that a plain reading of the rule “does not authorize a trial court to sua sponte direct a verdict of acquittal after a jury has rendered a verdict in a criminal case.” While the rule “expressly states that a court may consider a directed verdict of acquittal on its own motion before the case is submitted to the jury for deliberation” (MCR 6.419(A)), “similar language is absent from the provision governing how such relief may be pursued and granted after the jury returns its verdict, MCR 6.419(C). Rather, that subrule provides that only ‘the defendant’ may move for a directed verdict of acquittal after a jury verdict is rendered.” The Michigan “Supreme Court included similarly limited language in MCR 6.431(B), providing that, ‘[o]n the defendant’s motion, the court may order a new trial on any ground that would support appellate reversal of the conviction or because it believes that the verdict has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’” The court noted that it “has interpreted such language as allowing a trial court to order a new trial in a criminal case only after a motion for a new trial has been brought by the defendant.” Given that the “language in MCR 6.419(C) is similarly plain and unambiguous,” it saw no reason why it should interpret that provision differently. Nothing in the record indicated “the trial court ever considered a directed verdict of acquittal on its own motion before the case was submitted to the jury.” Further, the record did not indicate “defendant ever moved for a directed verdict of acquittal[.]” While he cited Lemmon, that case “did not involve or purport to speak to a trial court’s authority to enter a directed verdict of acquittal sua sponte after a jury verdict. Nor did Lemmon suggest that the due-process considerations underlying a directed verdict of acquittal conflict with the parameters that our court rules have placed on how that relief may be pursued and granted.”