Timeliness of a challenge to the validity of a trust; Applicability of the six-month limitations period in MCL 700.7604(1)(b); Whether a Statutory Notice complied with § 7604(1)(b)’s requirements; “Date” defined; Whether substantial compliance was sufficient; Laches; Lack of prejudice; Applicability of the two-year limitations period in MCL 700.7604(1)(a); The Michigan Trust Code (MTC); The Estates & Protected Individuals Code (EPIC)

The court held that the probate court erred in ruling that appellants’ claim contesting the validity of their mother’s trust because of undue influence was barred by the six-month limitations period in MCL 700.7604(1)(b). Because the Statutory Notice they received did not comply with the date requirement in § 7604(1)(b)(iii), the two-year limitations period in MCL 700.7604(1)(a) applied and their challenge was timely. Thus, the court reversed summary disposition for appellee-Hastings Fire Department (Hastings FD) and remanded. It concluded MCL 700.7604’s requirements “were not met because the trustee did not provide the dates of all amendments to the trust that were known to her in the notice she provided to appellants.” Thus, they “had two years from the date of their mother’s death to commence this action, not the six months argued by Hastings FD.” Hastings FD contended that, while “the Statutory Notice did not technically comply with the statutory requirements by failing to list the date of the Second Amendment, [it] still provided the relevant information by allowing appellants to infer a five-week period in which the Second Amendment was executed.” Hastings FD essentially asserted “that substantial compliance resulting in actual notice to appellants, rather than strict compliance with the terms of § 7604(1)(b), is required.” The court disagreed, noting that Hastings FD did not identify any “substantial compliance provision in § 7604 or such a provision in the MTC or EPIC that would apply to § 7604. Moreover, specific statutes within EPIC have their own substantial compliance provisions for discrete topics. . . . The express inclusion of [such] provisions in other areas of EPIC combined with the absence of such a provision in § 7604 support that the Legislature intended that § 7604 be enforced as written.” Thus, the court found that “the Statutory Notice was required to strictly comply with the terms of § 7604(1)(b) for application of the six-month limitations period.” It also rejected Hastings FD’s argument that the court could “affirm the probate court’s order on the alternative” ground of laches. It noted that Hastings FD “failed to argue in the probate court or this Court that it was prejudiced by appellants’ delay in asserting their rights.” Rather, it only asserted “that the delay in filing the petition forced the Trust to incur the cost of belated and ‘Trust-depleting’ litigation. This is not prejudice resulting from inexcusable delay.”