Failure to exhaust administrative remedies; Motion for relief from judgment on remand; Principle that a trial court may not grant relief from an appellate court’s judgment; Sumner v General Motors Co; Scope of remand; Notices of foreclosure; MCL 600.3212; Defect in a notice of foreclosure; Arnold v DMR Fin Servs, Inc; “Harm”; Choice of law; The one-action rule; MCL 600.3204(1)(b); Greenville Lafayette, LLC v Elgin State Bank; Sanctions; MCR 2.603(D)(4); MCR 2.119(E)

Holding that the trial court properly denied plaintiffs’ and intervenors’ relief from judgment motion and properly declined to consider new evidence, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant-Amos Financial. But it remanded on the issue of sanctions. Plaintiffs brought this action against defendant to prevent the foreclosures of its Michigan properties and obtain monetary damages, including damages related to the loss of several stores in Illinois. Plaintiffs and intervenors claimed defendant “could be held liable for purchasing ‘bad debt’ and ‘continuing’ the fraud by attempting to foreclose despite knowledge of” its predecessor’s fraudulent conduct. They also challenged a variety of defendant’s actions. On appeal, plaintiffs and intervenors argued that the trial court erred by denying their motion for relief from judgment and by failing to consider plaintiffs’ new evidence. The court disagreed, noting that “the trial court correctly decided that it lacked authority to grant relief from” the court’s judgment in a prior appeal. And because they “implicitly conceded the issue [of failure to exhaust administrative remedies] before, and fail[ed] to explain on appeal their reasons for doing so,” the court declined to consider their proposed evidence. It also found their argument that defendant “hid plaintiffs’ own actions from them disingenuous . . . .” The court next rejected their argument that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition for defendant “because (1) there were various defects in [its] notices of foreclosure; (2) the foreclosures violated Illinois law; and (3) the foreclosures violated the one-action rule.” First, the mortgagors listed on one of the mortgages were proper, the amounts due were not irreconcilable, there was no alleged false statement, and the date of assignment did not need to be listed. Second, because “each mortgage explicitly lists foreclosure by advertisement as one of the lender’s ‘rights and remedies’” in the event of a default, “the procedure to enforce this right is governed by Michigan law.” Third, defendant “was entitled to foreclose on both properties at issue on the basis of the parties’ default on the 2008 loan.” Finally, the court disagreed that the trial court erred in failing to consider sanctions under MCR 2.603(D)(4), but agreed that it erred by failing to do so under MCR 2.119(E). While the court’s “prior opinion did not expressly order the trial court to assess sanctions under MCR 2.119(E), its finding that Amos was subject to such sanctions, coupled with the mandatory term ‘shall’ in the rule itself, demonstrates that the trial court was required to consider sanctions under the rule on remand. Its failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.”