Sentencing for AWIM; Consideration of defendant’s youth; Miller v Alabama; People v Boykin; Proportionality; Effect of a within-guidelines sentence; Order that defendant be moved to an adult prison when she turned 18; Abuse of discretion standard; Constitutionality of the automatic waiver statute (MCL 712A.4); People v Hana
The court concluded that the trial court considered defendant’s youth in sentencing her for her AWIM conviction, and rejected her claim that her within-guidelines sentence was disproportionate. Further, the “trial court was well within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes when it ordered” her to be moved to an adult prison when she turned 18. Finally, her challenge to the constitutionality of the automatic waiver statute failed given that the Michigan Supreme Court ruled in Hana that it is constitutional. Thus, the court affirmed her 15 to 55-year sentence. The “case arose when defendant, then 14 years old, attempted to murder her best friend.” Relying on Miller, she asserted her sentence was “invalid because the trial court failed to consider her youth.” The Michigan Supreme Court noted in Boykin that while youth must be considered in imposing term-of-years sentences on juveniles convicted of first-degree murder, “‘this consideration need not be articulated on the record.’” Here, the trial court stated at defendant’s resentencing “that it ‘listened to all of the testimony’ that was provided during the hearing and read defendant’s sentencing memorandum and attached documents. The ‘testimony’” it referenced included “that of two of defendant’s experts, who testified at length about the effects of youth on cognitive function and decision-making as well as defendant’s specific growth and development since being incarcerated. In addition, [her] sentencing memorandum addressed defendant’s psychological evaluation, which discussed the immaturity of [her] frontal lobe and its impact on her decision-making capabilities, and also addressed her growth and progress toward rehabilitation. Finally, the documents attached to [her] sentencing memorandum reviewed by the trial court included the actual psychological evaluation as well as numerous letters of support for defendant. Given the extensive discussion of [her] youth in this evidence, the trial court did consider defendant’s youth when it resentenced her, even though it did not specifically articulate doing so.” As to her proportionality argument, she failed “to explain on appeal how” the mitigating factors she cited rendered “her sentence disproportionate in light of the trial court’s stated reasons.”
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