Sentencing; Calculation of jail credit; MCL 769.11b; People v Prieskorn; People v Adkins; Binding precedent; People v Robar

The court held that defendant was not entitled to additional jail credit in this case. He was sentenced to 6 to 20 years, with 378 days of jail credit, after pleading no contest to AWIGBH by strangulation, as a third-offense habitual offender. He was also sentenced for an unrelated charge, at a different hearing, in another county. At his sentencing in this case, he claimed he was entitled to credit for the time he spent incarcerated in the other county before his arraignment here. The trial court found he was not entitled to jail credit until he was arraigned in this case. He received 378 days of jail credit for the time he spent incarcerated between his arraignment in the present case and his sentencing in the other case. He moved to correct his sentence, contending he should have received an additional 199 days of jail credit starting from the date of his arrest in the other county to the date of his arraignment in this case. He claimed that, because of the arrest warrant, this county had full authority over him despite his incarceration in another county. He also asserted that he was entitled to an additional 76 days of jail credit from the date of his sentencing in the other county to the date of his sentencing in this case. The trial court denied his motion. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that he was entitled to additional jail credit for both the 199 days he was incarcerated in the other county before his arraignment here, and the 76 days he served for his other conviction before he was sentenced on this one. “Under Prieskorn and Adkins, defendant is not entitled to additional jail credit. The time he spent in jail for the unrelated . . . charges was not because of an inability to post bond for the” present offense. In addition, his “assertion that he was entitled to jail credit because he wrote a letter” informing the district court here that he was detained in another county, and that the county prosecutor in this case “issued a warrant for his arrest, lacks merit under Adkins. These facts do not ‘convert the time’” he spent in jail for the other charge into time served for the offense that he was convicted of here. He acknowledged that the jail credit for his present sentence ceased when he was sentenced in the other case, “and that this was the correct result under Prieskorn. He instead” claimed Prieskorn and Adkins were wrongly decided. “However, ‘[w]e are bound to follow decisions of the Supreme Court unless those decisions have clearly been overruled or superseded.’ Prieskorn and Adkins remain good law, and we are bound by their holdings.” Affirmed.