Sufficiency of the evidence; Self-defense; People v Guajardo; Mistrial; People v Ortiz-Kehoe; Drug profile evidence; Relevance; MRE 401; Conditional relevance; MRE 104(b); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to make a futile objection; Prosecutorial error; People v Dobek; Vouching; Mischaracterizing evidence; Jury composition; Fair cross-section; People v Bryant; Duren v Missouri; Admission of text messages under MRE 103(a)(1); Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Cumulative error; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 6; Reasonableness & proportionality of a within-guidelines sentence

Finding no errors requiring reversal, the court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences. She was convicted of second-degree murder, CCW, and felony-firearm for shooting and killing the victim. She was sentenced to 30 to 60 years for the murder conviction to be served consecutively to a 2-year term for the felony-firearm conviction with credit for 463 days served as well as time served for the CCW conviction. On appeal, the court found the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find she did not act in self-defense. It noted “the jury could have rationally found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s belief that there was an imminent danger to her life or threat of bodily harm was not reasonable and that her use of deadly force was therefore not justifiable self-defense.” It also found she failed to show “that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her motion for a mistrial.” Further, the trial court’s rulings excluding drug profile evidence related to the victim were not erroneous and did not deny her the right to present a defense of self-defense. She abandoned her argument that the trial court erred by sustaining the prosecutor’s objection when defense counsel asked her about a threat, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile objection. The court also concluded that the prosecution did not improperly vouch for witnesses or mischaracterize testimony. It found she failed to establish prosecutorial error on either ground, and any “improper prejudicial effect could have been cured by a proper” instruction. It next rejected her challenge to the racial composition of the jury pool, finding she “failed to provide any evidence to support . . . two requirements of a prima facie case under the Bryant/Duren framework.” Even accepting her “assertion that only one out of the 90 jury pool members was a ‘person of color,’ [she] has not provided any evidence regarding the racial composition of jury pools in” the county over time. In addition, “text messages introduced into evidence provided insight into” her state of mind about the killing, and were not unfairly prejudicial. Further, there was no cumulative error. Finally, defendant’s “25-point score for OV 6 is consistent with the jury’s verdict convicting her of second-degree murder.” And she failed to meet “her burden of showing that her within-guidelines sentence was unreasonable or disproportionate.”