42 USC § 1983 claims against a prosecutor; “Absolute prosecutorial immunity”; Whether the prosecutor’s pretrial, post-indictment interactions with trial witnesses constituted an “advocacy” or an “investigative” function; Municipal liability under Monell v Department of Soc Servs of NY; Effect of plaintiff’s acceptance of a settlement under Michigan’s Wrongful Imprisonment Compensation Act (WICA); MCL 691.1753; Enforceability of a release provision; Leaman v Ohio Dep’t of Mental Retardation & Dev Disabilities

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that when defendant-prosecutor (Donaldson) interviewed witnesses post-indictment but pretrial, he was acting in his role as an “advocate” and not as an “investigator,” and thus, was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. It also held plaintiff-Smith released his claim against defendant-Wayne County when he accepted a settlement under Michigan’s WICA. Smith was convicted of first-degree murder and a firearm charge, largely based on testimony from a fellow jail inmate. When the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Conviction Integrity Unit reviewed the case, it concluded that the inmate’s testimony was part of a jailhouse-informant scheme and Smith’s convictions were vacated. He received compensation under Michigan’s WICA. His settlement agreement provided he released all claims against the State for his incarceration. He then brought this suit against Donaldson and Wayne County, asserting § 1983 claims against Donaldson and a Monell claim against the County. The district court held that the WICA settlement agreement release applied to the County and that Donaldson was entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. On appeal, the court explained that prosecutorial immunity is available under § 1983 and applied the “functional approach” that provides a prosecutor with absolute immunity for conduct closely related with judicial criminal process. “When a prosecutor acts as an advocate participating in a judicial proceeding,” he or she has absolute immunity. Further, “investigatory functions that ‘relate to an advocate’s preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial proceedings’ are entitled to” such immunity. But when “‘a prosecutor performs the investigative functions normally performed by a detective or police officer,’” he or she only receives qualified immunity. The issue here involved “interactions between prosecutors and trial witnesses post-indictment but pretrial.” The court clarified that the “focus should always be on the function the prosecutor is performing. . . . But the conduct’s timing is a relevant factor in determining whether the function is purely investigatory or taken in preparation for the” advocate role. The court held that “Donaldson acted as an advocate preparing a witness for trial, not an investigator identifying and developing evidence in the first instance.” Thus, he was “entitled to absolute immunity.” The court also held that Smith released his Monell claim against the County when he accepted the WICA settlement. Its rationale in Leaman foreclosed his “argument that WICA’s release provision is enforceable only if there is a written agreement with Smith expressly incorporating or acknowledging the provision.” Affirmed.