e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 84139
Opinion Date : 08/07/2025
e-Journal Date : 08/19/2025
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : People v. Llanes
Practice Area(s) : Criminal Law
Judge(s) : Per Curiam - Maldonado, M.J. Kelly, and Riordan
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Issues:

Juvenile sentencing; Successive motion for relief from judgment; MCR 6.502(G); Retroactive changes in the law under MCR 6.502(G)(2); Miller v Alabama; Montgomery v Louisiana; “Good cause” & “actual prejudice”; New scientific evidence; MCR 6.508(D)(3)(a) & (b)

Summary

The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by finding defendant’s successive motion for relief from judgment was not based upon a retroactive change in law and did not satisfy the procedural bar of MCR 6.502(G). Thus, it reversed the order at issue and remanded for the trial court to address the merits of his successive motion for relief from judgment under MCR 6.508(D). Defendant was convicted of CSC I and assault with intent to commit sexual penetration, apparently on the basis that he forced the victim to perform oral sex on him and used a mop handle to violate her. The trial court imposed a substantial upward departure, sentencing him to 75 to 150 years for the former, and 6 to 10 concurrent years for the latter. In a prior appeal, the court affirmed. The trial court subsequently denied his motion for relief from judgment on the basis of newly discovered evidence. His delayed application for leave to appeal was also denied. The trial court then denied his successive motion for relief from judgment, and his application for leave to appeal was again denied. However, the Supreme Court remanded. On remand, the court agreed with defendant that “in juvenile sentencing cases, repeated citation to and reliance upon the rationale of Miller and Montgomery is sufficient to satisfy the procedural bar of MCR 6.502(G)(2)(a)[.]” It noted his “successive motion for relief from judgment repeatedly cited Miller and Montgomery and argued that the rationale reflected in those cases should be extended to the instant case.” And because “Miller is retroactive under Montgomery, his successive motion for relief from judgment is ‘based upon a retroactive change in law’ and therefore satisfies the procedural bar of MCR 6.502(G).”

Full PDF Opinion