Motion for a default judgment as a sanction for discovery abuses; MCR 2.313(B)(2); MCR 2.504(B)(1); Duray Dev, LLC v Perrin; Traxler v Ford Motor Co; Swain v Morse

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting plaintiff’s request for a “default judgment against defendants as a sanction for discovery abuses.” Plaintiff sued defendants for medical malpractice. A jury returned a verdict of no cause of action. The court noted the factors to be considered by a trial court when asked to impose a discovery sanction, and that sanctions “such as dismissal or default should be imposed only when the conduct at issue is flagrant or involves wanton refusal to facilitate discovery, typically involving repeated violations of a court order.” After reviewing the record, the court could not “say that there was an abuse of discretion in denying plaintiff’s request for default judgment when the trial court correctly considered, albeit implicitly, the factors outlined in Perrin, regarding whether to impose a discovery sanction, and Traxler, regarding whether to impose a default judgment. The trial court appropriately weighed relevant considerations including the timing of plaintiff’s motion, the timing of defendants’ purported violation, defendants’ efforts to cure any discovery defects, and prejudice.” Further, the court did not “find that the trial court’s rejection of plaintiff’s request falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” It noted that a “trial court has discretion to impose a default but ‘only where the conduct at issue is flagrant or involves wanton refusal to facilitate discovery.’” Plaintiff did not obtain “an order to compel following violations of discovery nor was there another ‘compelling circumstance’ when the trial court determined that defendants produced the information promptly after discovering it.” While plaintiff argued that their “failure to comply with discovery was willful, meaning ‘conscious or intentional, and not accidental,’ the trial court rejected this characterization.” The court found “no clear error in the trial court’s factual findings underpinning its reasoning.” Comparing this case to Traxler, where it upheld a default judgment sanction, the court found that it was “not evident from the record here that defendants’ failure to produce the documents and witnesses earlier was similarly ‘flagrant’ or involved ‘wanton refusal to facilitate discovery’ such that [it] should overturn a jury verdict and order entry of a default against defendants.” Affirmed.