Successive motion for relief from judgment; SORA registration; Ex post facto laws; Whether the statute is punitive; People v Betts; Kennedy v Mendoza-Martinez; Constitutionality of the 2021 SORA; People v Kiczenski; Ineffective assistance of counsel as to a guilty plea

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s successive motion for relief from judgment, and he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. He was convicted of CSC I and II in 1994. In a prior appeal, the court affirmed his convictions and sentences. “Over the next two decades, defendant filed numerous motions for relief from judgment, which were denied, as were his applications for leave to appeal those denials.” In 2022, he again moved for relief from judgment, this time arguing that the trial court should remove him from the sex offender registry on the basis of a change of law announced in Betts. He also claimed his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by giving him bad advice that led him to reject a plea offer. In the present appeal, the court rejected his contention that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for relief from judgment, because it failed to consider whether the current SORA is punitive and whether its retroactive application violates ex post facto laws. Because he “was convicted of sexual offenses, application of the 2021 SORA to defendant does not constitute punishment and cannot give rise to an ex post facto violation. And although the trial court did not have the opportunity to consider Kiczenski, it reached the correct result in denying” his motion for relief from judgment. In addition, defense “counsel’s correct advice regarding the possible consequences of defendant’s plea in light of pending legislation did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and does not support [his] claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Affirmed.