e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 84166
Opinion Date : 08/11/2025
e-Journal Date : 08/22/2025
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : In re Melnik Revocable Living Trust
Practice Area(s) : Litigation Probate
Judge(s) : Per Curiam - O'Brien, Boonstra, and Wallace
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Issues:

Challenge to a trust amendment; Sanctions for filing a frivolous action; MCR 1.109; MCL 600.2591; “Frivolous”; MCL 600.2591(3)(a); Pioneer State Mut Ins Co v Michalek; LaRose Mkt, Inc v Sylvan Ctr, Inc; Interpretation of a trust; Testamentary capacity; In re Sprenger’s Estate; Whether an action was initiated for an improper purpose; MCR 1.109(E)(5)(c)

Summary

The court held that the probate court did not err by granting in part respondent’s motion for sanctions and imposing a sanction of $105,136 on petitioners, jointly and severally. In 2023, petitioners filed a verified petition with the probate court contesting the validity of a trust amendment on the grounds that the grantor (M) lacked sufficient mental capacity to amend the trust and remove them as beneficiaries in 2019. In 2024, after 8 months of discovery, petitioners filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss their suit, stating that their belief that M lacked testamentary capacity had been based on “the medical records in their possession at the time the verified petition was filed, but that ‘discovery did not confirm this belief.’” They also stated that their expert “was unable to conclude with a reasonable degree of certainty that” M lacked testamentary capacity when he amended the trust. They requested an order dismissing the case. Shortly thereafter, respondent filed a motion for sanctions, arguing that the lawsuit was initiated in violation of MCR 1.109 and MCL 600.2591. The probate court dismissed the case and awarded respondent sanctions. On appeal, the court rejected petitioners’ argument that the probate court erred by finding their action was frivolous and awarding sanctions. The mere fact that M “had at some point in his life been diagnosed with a condition that could have affected his testamentary capacity was insufficient to support a claim for lack of capacity, but in this case it was not only insufficient, but it was contradicted by petitioners’ own testimony about their own experiences with” M. On this record, the court could not “say that the probate court clearly erred by holding that petitioners knew or should have known that their verified petition was not well-grounded in fact.” Finally, although a “closer call,” the court was ultimately “not left with a firm conviction that a mistake was made” as to one petitioner’s purpose in filing the petition, and any error as to the other petitioner was harmless given “the probate court’s findings under MCR 1.109(E)(5)(b) and MCL 600.2591(3)(a)(ii).” Affirmed.

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