Trust administration dispute; Motion to set aside a settlement agreement & stipulated order; Validity of the order; Mutual mistake; Newton v Progressive Marathon Ins Co; Statute of frauds; MCR 2.507(G); Lack of consideration; “Meeting of the minds”; Validity of consent to the agreement; Duress; Undue influence; Unconscionability; Unclean hands; McFerren v B&B Inv Group; Sanctions; MCL 600.2591; “Frivolous”; MCR 1.109

Rejecting appellant-Nickel’s arguments that the settlement agreement and stipulated order in this trust administration dispute “were invalid or should be invalidated on several grounds,” the court affirmed the probate court’s denial of her motion to set aside the order. As to her mutual mistake argument, she asserted “the parties incorrectly believed that the stipulated order would not modify the terms of the trusts. It is doubtful that all of the parties and the probate court in fact believed this, but even if true, Nickel’s argument is that the parties were mistaken about the legal effect of the stipulated order rather than whether the stipulated order, as drafted, accurately recited [their] agreement, which is not grounds for challenging the validity of the agreement.” She also contended the stipulated order violated the statute of frauds. MCR 2.507(G) “is considered a functional equivalent of the statute of frauds.” While Nickel asserted she did not sign the order, “the court rule expressly does not require her own personal signature, and it is undisputed that the order was signed by her attorney.” She contended he “was not authorized to sign documents on her behalf when he signed the order. However, [he] remained her attorney of record until a month after the stipulated order was signed, so her attorney, at the very least, had the apparent authority to bind her to the” order. As to her lack of consideration claim, the settlement “insured that Nickel would have input into the selection of the successor trustee, and could prevent [appellee-]Greg from being named to that role by agreement of the remaining siblings—something she had clearly expressed that she did not want. She was, therefore, granted something valuable in the settlement agreement[.]” The court also rejected her claim there was no meeting of the minds. “Nickel affirmatively agreed to the settlement agreement, the terms of which were accurately reflected in the stipulated order. Accordingly, the settlement agreement was not invalid for lack of agreement on material terms.” Her alternative arguments that her consent was invalid due to “duress or undue influence, and that the resulting agreement is unconscionable[,]” likewise failed. Further, the court found that the probate court did not err in “finding that her motion to set aside the stipulated order was frivolous, and by failing to sanction the [appellees] for initially bringing this case as a civil action.”