Motion to quash evidence; Cell phone search warrants; Probable cause; Particularity requirement; People v Carson; The exclusionary rule; People v LoCicero (After Remand); The good-faith exception; People v Hughes; The independent source doctrine; People v Smith; Oral argument; MCR 2.119(E)(3); Evidentiary hearing; Franks v Delaware

Holding that the second warrant at issue in this case was sufficiently particular pursuant to both Carson and “the independent source doctrine because it draws from sources independent of the” first warrant, the court affirmed the denial of defendant’s motion to quash the evidence obtained pursuant to the second warrant. He moved to quash the evidence obtained from his cell phone during an investigation into an arson and murder. The trial court denied the motion, finding that arguments pertaining to the validity of the first warrant were moot because a second warrant was issued, and that the second warrant was valid. It also denied his motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the court first declined to consider the validity of the first warrant, finding it moot based on its holding as to the second warrant. It then agreed with the prosecution that the second warrant “was valid pursuant to the independent source doctrine because it drew from sources independent of the [first] warrant, and therefore any property seized under that warrant does not harken back to the purportedly invalid” first warrant as its source. “[D]efendant has not alleged, let alone demonstrated, that the affidavits for the search warrants that allowed police to obtain data from the victim’s bank account, delivery service, videogame service, or PayPal, referred to defendant’s cell phone or anything found on” it. Thus, the second warrant “was valid because it drew from sources independent of the” first warrant. The court also rejected defendant’s claim that the trial court wrongfully denied him the right to present oral argument at the hearing on his motion to quash. “[T]he trial court properly invoked MCR 2.119(E)(3), explaining that the parties’ briefs were so thorough as to require no additional elaboration[.]” The record demonstrated “that the issues were, in fact, thoroughly briefed in the” trial court. As such, it did not “abuse its discretion by omitting oral argument as to his motion to quash the search warrants.” Finally, the court rejected his contention that the trial court erred by not conducting an evidentiary hearing as to the issuance of the warrants in this matter under Franks. He “effectively abandoned the issue of whether the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing as to the veracity of the warrants issued in this matter by failing to actually make that argument here and, instead, presented arguments that were never made to the trial court in defendant’s motion to quash.”