Order for involuntary mental-health treatment; Hearsay; “Person requiring treatment” under MCL 330.1401; Mental Health Code (MHC)

The court held that as to respondent’s hearsay claim, he did not identify “any error in the admission of evidence at his hearing, let alone plain error that affected his substantial rights.” Also, it was “not persuaded that the trial clearly erred when it found by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was ‘a person requiring treatment’ under MCL 330.1401(1)(a) and (c).” Thus, the court affirmed “the probate court’s order requiring respondent to involuntarily undergo mental-health treatment pursuant to the” MHC. He contended “the probate court reversibly erred by considering two statements that constituted inadmissible hearsay[.]” As to the statement that he “had a ‘plan’ to kill his father, it was not obviously inadmissible. True, [it] was hearsay—[psychiatrist D’s] clinical certificate stated that respondent had ‘expressed a calculated plan to kill father’ according to a ‘report’ that [D] had reviewed, and [D] testified at respondent’s hearing that respondent had ‘a calculated plan to kill his father’ ‘[a]ccording to documentation from Network180.’” However, D “testified that he relied on these documents when diagnosing respondent, so the court was permitted to consider the statement pursuant to MRE 1101(b)(10).” Also, as to the statement in psychiatrist M’s ‘“clinical certificate that respondent did not want treatment because he did not ‘want it to dull his desire to kill his dad,’ respondent” was correct that this “was double hearsay—[M] did not testify, and [M’s] certificate states that she was told about respondent’s statement by an unnamed ‘clinician.”’ But the court noted D “testified that he relied on this hearsay data to form his opinion—he said that his diagnosis of respondent was based in part on his review of ‘documentation from Network180’ (where [M] examined respondent) stating that respondent refused treatment ‘because he did not want the treatment to get rid of his homicidal thoughts towards his father.’ The probate court later specifically asked [D] whether he had reviewed the statement in [M’s] clinical certificate that respondent takes issue with, and [D] said that he had, that he asked respondent about it while examining him, and that respondent denied making it.” Thus, while both M’s “clinical certificate and the statement therein were hearsay data, [D’s] testimony clearly established that this hearsay data formed part of the basis for his opinion. The probate court was thus permitted to consider that evidence under MRE 1101(b)(10).” Finally, as to the “person requiring treatment” finding, the evidence established that he “had repeated and ongoing thoughts of murdering his father and grandmother; the thoughts had gone as far as planning the murder of his father; respondent recognized, to some extent, that his thoughts were dangerous and placed others at risk; but [he] did not want treatment to help alleviate” them because he felt that they “were justified.”