Due process; Right against self-incrimination; Miranda warnings; People v Cortez; Validity of a Miranda waiver; People v Eliason; Renewed Miranda warnings; People v Ray; Coercion; People v Stewart; Custodial interrogation; People v Raper; Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to file a motion to suppress; Failure to file a futile motion

The court held that: (1) defendant’s statements to police “were properly admitted because he provided voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waivers of his Miranda rights when he was subject to custodial interrogation, and the evidence [did] not suggest that [his] statements throughout the investigation were involuntary or coerced”; and (2) he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. He was convicted of CSC II for sexually assaulting his daughter’s friend. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that his Miranda waiver was involuntary because the police chief made several statements that were coercive and deceptive while advising him of his rights. “Under the totality of the circumstances . . . defendant’s waiver was valid and made of [his] ‘own free and deliberate choice, rather than the product of intimidation.’” The court also rejected his claim that his inculpatory statement during the postpolygraph interview was involuntarily coerced and that he should have been issued renewed Miranda warnings after the polygraph examination concluded. “The circumstances between defendant’s valid waiver of his rights and the postpolygraph questioning did not change so seriously that his answers were no longer voluntary, and [the police chief] was not required ‘to rewarn [him] of his constitutional rights in the limited exchange that ensued immediately after the polygraph.’” The court next rejected his contention that his privilege against self-incrimination was violated because the officer failed to advise him of his Miranda rights before he made inculpatory statements. “The record does not suggest that this information was the product of an unwarned interrogation . . . .” Further, the court rejected his argument that additional statements he made were inadmissible because they were the product of his prior involuntary statements and elicited through an entire course of coercive police conduct. “This argument is meritless because, as noted above, defendant’s several waivers were valid and his inculpatory statements were voluntarily given.” Finally, the court rejected his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress his inculpatory statements based on his other claims of error. “Defendant would not have prevailed on a motion to suppress at trial because his statements to law enforcement were properly admitted.” Affirmed.