Sufficiency of the evidence; First-degree felony murder; MCL 750.316; Malice; Aiding & abetting; MCL 767.39; Robbery; MCL 750.529; Torture; MCL 750.85; AWIM; MCL 750.83; Upward departure sentence; Proportionality; People v Steanhouse; Justification for an upward departure; People v Dixon-Bey; Cruel or unusual punishment; People v Taylor; Resentencing on a concurrent sentence where it was based on a legal misconception that defendant was required to serve a mandatory LWOP sentence on the greater offense; People v Turner

The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions, but that the trial court did not properly justify its upward departure as to three of the sentences. He was convicted of first-degree felony murder, armed robbery, AWIM, torture, unlawful imprisonment, and felony-firearm in the fatal and nonfatal shooting of two victims, A and H. The trial court sentenced him to life for felony murder, 30 to 45 years for armed robbery, AWIM, and torture, and 10 to 15 for unlawful imprisonment, to be served concurrently, and a consecutive 2-year term for felony-firearm. On appeal, the court found that the evidence was sufficient “to support a jury finding that defendant aided and abetted both an assault with intent to murder [H] and the first-degree felony murder of [A] by establishing [he] ‘had knowledge that the principal intended its commission at the time that [he] gave aid and encouragement’ and that ‘the charged offense was a natural and probable consequence of the commission of the intended offense.’” However, it found that the trial court erred by failing to state its rationale for its upward sentence departure for the armed robbery, AWIM, and torture convictions. “Although [it] identified a factor accounted for by the guidelines but given inadequate weight, it failed to explain why its imposed sentence was more proportionate to defendant and his conduct than a different sentence would have been, and it failed to explain the extent of its departure independent of its reasons to depart.” As such, the court vacated those sentences and remanded for resentencing. It noted it did “not foreclose the possibility that such sentences would comply with the principle of proportionality, but defendant must be resentenced under the correct legal standard and with an opportunity for the trial court to explain the sentence imposed.” Finally, in light of Taylor’s “holding that MCL 750.316’s mandatory life sentence for first-degree murder violates the . . . prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment when applied to anyone under the age of 21 at the time of” the offense, and the fact that “defendant was 19 years old at the time of” his offense, he was “automatically entitled to resentencing on his first-degree murder conviction consistent with Taylor.” And in light of Turner, the trial court may exercise its discretion to resentence him if his sentence was based on a legal misconception that he was required to serve a mandatory LWOP sentence on the greater offense. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for resentencing.