Sufficiency of the evidence; Felony murder; People v Gillis; Insanity defense; Great weight of the evidence; Sentencing; Life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP); Cruel or unusual punishment; People v Taylor

The court affirmed defendant’s convictions, but reversed and remanded his LWOP sentence for resentencing consistent with Taylor. He was convicted “of first-degree murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, carjacking,” also known as felony murder; second-degree murder; and felony-firearm. He was sentenced to concurrent sentences of LWOP for the crime of felony murder and 525 months to 90 years for second-degree murder. The trial court also sentenced him to two years for each of the felony-firearm convictions, to be served consecutive to the felony murder and second-degree murder sentences, respectively. As to felony murder, the court concluded that viewing “the evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Gillis factors of (1) time; (2) place; (3) causation; and (4) continuity of action, reasonably support a finding that defendant murdered [victim-J] in the perpetration of a carjacking. The murder and carjacking took place within a short period of time; both crimes occurred in the same physical location; the jury could reasonably infer that defendant murdered [J] to effectuate the carjacking; and the crimes occurred in a continuous course of action (i.e., without defendant having reached a point of ‘temporary safety’ in the interim . . . .” Thus, the court concluded that sufficient evidence supported his conviction of felony murder. Defendant next argued that that Dr. W’s (Ph.D. psychologist) “testimony proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was suffering from organic schizophrenia, which made him legally insane at the time of the murders.” He essentially asked the court “to reweigh the credibility of the respective expert opinions to discount [Dr. S’s (a Ph.D. forensic psychologist)] conclusion that defendant’s legal insanity was the result of voluntary use of controlled substances in favor of [W’s] conclusion that [it] was a psychotic break caused by his first episode of emerging paranoid schizophrenia. However, ‘[i]t is the province of the jury to determine questions of fact and assess the credibility of witnesses.’” There was no basis to find S’s “testimony was without probative value or contrary to physical reality, despite defendant’s disagreement with his methods and conclusions.” The court concluded that regardless of why the jury found he “was not legally insane at the time of the murders, [his] motion for a new trial was based solely on conflicting testimony and the credibility of the expert witnesses. It was the jury’s role to evaluate the evidence, weigh the credibility of the witnesses, and make the ultimate findings of fact.” Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying his “motion for a new trial because defendant failed to show that the verdict was against the great weight of evidence.” As to the LWOP sentence, Taylor “expressly applies retroactively to cases on collateral review, and, therefore, applies to this case because defendant received a mandatory LWOP sentence, and he was 19 years old when he committed the felony murder of” J.