Order for involuntary mental-health treatment; Request for a deferral; MCL 330.1455(6); “Person requiring treatment”; MCL 330.1401(a) & (c)

Holding that the probate court (1) did not abuse its discretion by holding a hearing despite respondent’s earlier request for a deferral and (2) did not err by finding that he “was a ‘person requiring treatment’ under MCL 330.1401(1)[,]” the court affirmed the order for involuntary mental-health treatment. The probate court recognized at the start of the hearing “that the case had originally been resolved by a deferral, but there was now a demand for hearing on the basis of noncompliance. MCL 330.1455(8) clearly allows for a hearing under these circumstances because the testimony of” a psychiatrist, Dr. D, “showed that respondent was not compliant with treatment after signing the deferral.” While respondent argued “that he complied with his treatment, [D’s] testimony established that respondent resisted increasing the dose of his medication. Respondent also did not agree with his diagnosis and refused a blood draw.” Respondent asserted that D “impermissibly relied on respondent’s mother’s claims that he would not take medication outside of the hospital, but [D] also testified that respondent himself stated several times that he would not take medication once he left the hospital. MCL 330.1455(6) requires that an individual seeking to defer a hearing ‘accept treatment as may be prescribed for the deferral period,’ and the evidence shows that respondent was not accepting treatment.” Thus, the probate “court did not abuse its discretion by holding a hearing despite [his] earlier request for a deferral.” He also took “issue with the demand for hearing form submitted in this case. While the demand for hearing form has boxes that could be checked to indicate that the individual refuses to accept treatment or that the individual orally demanded a hearing, neither box was checked.” The probate “court reasoned, under these circumstances, that the hospital’s designee inadvertently failed to check the box indicating that the individual refused to accept treatment.” Its reasoning proved correct when D “testified at the hearing that respondent had refused treatment (which was why a hearing was demanded following the request for deferral).” The court also held that respondent’s “threats, in combination with testimony about [his] paranoia, delusional thinking, and labile or unstable mood, established a reasonable expectation of harm to himself or others[.]” As a result, the probate “court did not err by finding that respondent qualified as a person requiring treatment under MCL 330.1401(1)(a).” There was also sufficient evidence that he “was not complying with recommended treatment.” Thus, the probate court did not err by determining that he “also qualified as a ‘person requiring treatment’ under MCL 330.1401(1)(c).”