Inconsistent-verdict claim; People v Montague; People v Vaughn; Conviction of first-degree premeditated murder & acquittal of related firearm charges; Sufficiency of the evidence for convictions of first-degree premeditated murder & conspiracy to commit it; People v Oros; People v Jackson; Identity; Sufficiency of the evidence for a retaliation against a witness conviction; MCL 750.122; Judicial bias; People v Stevens

The court held that defendant was not entitled to relief based on allegedly inconsistent jury verdicts convicting him of first-degree premeditated murder but acquitting him of felony-firearm and FIP. Further, there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions of premeditated murder, conspiracy to commit it, and retaliation against a witness. Finally, the court rejected his judicial bias claim. The victim was murdered after her preliminary exam testimony related to a carjacking. The court first determined that even if it assumed “the verdicts were factually inconsistent, defendant is not entitled to any relief on the basis of an alleged inconsistency in the verdicts because juries are permitted to reach inconsistent verdicts.” It noted that he did “not offer any evidence to show that there was juror confusion, that the jury misunderstood its instructions, or that there was an impermissible compromise that occurred in relation to the verdict, which is the only basis on which” it could grant relief for inconsistent verdicts. The jury was “not required to explain its decision, and the fact that [it] may have shown defendant some leniency on the weapon charges cannot form the basis for relief.” The court found the case analogous to Vaughn, where the Michigan “Supreme Court held that an acquittal of felony-firearm did not mandate a reversal of the underlying felony conviction, in part because the jury was able to show the defendant leniency.” As to his sufficiency challenges, the victim’s “autopsy revealed she suffered 12 gunshot wounds, including three to the head, three to the chest, and others in various parts of her body. The evidence also supported that the shooter was lying in wait behind a garbage can, and continued shooting at the victim even after she fell.” As to the identity element, “DNA evidence tied defendant to the shooting. At trial, there was expert testimony that the DNA sample from the garbage can handle was ‘at least 40 octillion times more likely’ to have originated from [him] and one other person than if the DNA originated from two unknown individuals.” Further, other circumstantial evidence supported his identity as the perpetrator. The evidence also supported that he “engaged in a criminal conspiracy by voluntarily agreeing to effectuate the commission of the” murder. Numerous phone calls and statements he made to two other people “both before and after the victim’s murder supported that [he] had specific intent to collaborate with [them] to pursue the crime.” Affirmed.