Fall on a public sidewalk; “Sidewalk exception” to governmental immunity; MCL 691.1402a; Presumption in MCL 691.1402a(3); Whether a signpost stub was part of the sidewalk as defined by the Governmental Tort Liability Act; MCL 691.1401(f); Mann v Detroit; LaMeau v Royal Oak; Setting aside a default; Service of process

The court concluded that “plaintiff overcame the presumption in MCL 691.1402a(3) that defendant maintained the sidewalk in reasonable repair, and the trial court did not err by denying” defendant-city’s summary disposition motion. Also, it found that because “defendant was not served with process and the default entered against it was void,” the trial court did not abuse “its discretion by setting aside the default.” Plaintiff fell and suffered personal injuries on a public sidewalk in the city. Because the court concluded “that there is at least a factual question of whether or not the signpost stub was a ‘dangerous condition in the sidewalk itself’ under MCL 691.1402a(3)(b),” it disagreed with defendant’s argument “that plaintiff’s claim was barred by governmental immunity.” It found that the “Mann Court’s analysis of MCL 691.1401(f) and LaMeau is applicable to the facts of this case. Similar to the defect in Mann, the signpost stub in this case is a metal protrusion embedded in the middle of a pedestrian walkway. Accordingly, defendant’s argument that liability for defects in the sidewalk are limited to the pavement itself is without merit.” On cross-appeal, plaintiff argued “the trial court abused its discretion by granting defendant’s motion to set aside the default because defendant did not establish it had good cause for its failure to respond to” his complaint. The court disagreed. There was no dispute “that plaintiff only attempted to effectuate service on defendant by sending the summons and complaint by certified mail to the mayor. This did not comply with the court rule. Therefore, defendant was not served with the summons and complaint in this case.” The court found that because “plaintiff did not serve defendant with a copy of the summons and complaint, the trial court never obtained personal jurisdiction over defendant.” It concluded that without “personal jurisdiction over defendant, the default entered against it was void.” In addition, “because the trial court did not obtain personal jurisdiction over defendant, defendant was not required to demonstrate ‘good cause’ or a ‘meritorious defense’ in order for the trial court to grant its motion to set aside the default.” Affirmed.