e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 84222
Opinion Date : 08/18/2025
e-Journal Date : 09/03/2025
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : RM v. LM
Practice Area(s) : Personal Protection Orders
Judge(s) : Per Curiam – Redford, Riordan, and Bazzi
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Issues:

Motion to terminate an ex parte PPO; Whether the trial court relied on false information; Nondomestic PPO statute (MCL 600.2950a); “Stalking” (MCL 750.411h(e)); “Course of conduct” (MCL 750.411h(1)(a)); “Harassment” (MCL 750.411h(1)(d)); Unconsented contact; Hayford v Hayford; Judicial misconduct; Grounds for disqualification; MCR 2.003(C); Defamation; American Transmission, Inc v Channel 7 of Detroit, Inc; Absolute privilege

Summary

The court held that respondent did not “show that the trial court lacked a reasonable basis for issuing, and continuing, the PPO” at issue. It also rejected her judicial misconduct claim, concluding that the trial court’s order denying her motion to terminate the PPO was “fully supported by the facts of record and the law.” Petitioner obtained the PPO ex parte on behalf of his son (RM), respondent’s great-grandson. The record reflected “that respondent was repeatedly told not to have contact with RM and that she was not welcome at RM’s events. Despite” this, she “continued to insert herself into RM’s extracurricular activities. The trial court correctly reminded [her] that being RM’s great-grandmother did not give her the right to have time with him. Ultimately, RM’s father and step-mother were in control of whom they wanted around RM, and because that wish was not respected, the trial court properly issued the PPO.” The court noted that she did not testify before the trial court and thus, “did not deny that she was told to stay away from RM or deny that she continued to appear at his extracurricular activities.” She also acknowledged on appeal “‘the rights of the parent of [RM] to determine who[m] [RM] can see.’” Her judicial misconduct argument was unpreserved because she “did not raise any claim of judicial bias or misconduct in the trial court[.]” In addition, her “only basis for alleging bias on” the part of the trial court judge (Judge C) “was that she had gained access to certain information from the custody case, but” she did not specify “any instance of such impropriety, nor cite[] authority in support of her position.” Respondent also asserted “that innuendoes about [her] drug use in the custody case, and such allegations in the petition of this case, as accepted by Judge [C], were false and defamatory.” The court noted that statements “made by judges, attorneys, and witnesses during the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged if they are relevant, material, or pertinent to the issue being tried.” In this case, Judge C “made clear that her findings were based on the stalking statute and the notice respondent received to stay away from RM. Respondent cites no authority according to which Judge [C] was not acting within her authority.” Affirmed.

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