Judicial conduct; People v Stevens; Veil of judicial impartiality; Right to a fair & impartial trial; Motion to suppress; Evidence flowing from an allegedly illegal stop & arrest; Reasonable suspicion; In-court identifications; Expert witness funding; Motion for a new trial

The court held that based on its review of the record, “the nature of the judge’s conduct does not favor a conclusion that the veil of impartiality was pierced.” Further, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress, and his other appellate claims also failed. He was convicted of bank robbery, armed robbery, and making a false report of terrorism. He first claimed “that the trial judge pierced the veil of judicial impartiality, and denied him a fair and impartial trial, through certain comments the judge made in front of the jury.” The court found as “to the judge’s conduct during cross-examination, it is evident from considering the judge’s statements in their full context, rather than out of context as defendant has described them, that each cited instance represented attempts by the trial court to prevent needless repetition in defendant’s cross-examinations and to keep the questioning focused on relevant issues and the issues that defendant was apparently intending to explore to the extent such issues were relevant and permissible.” While a few statements by the trial judge “could have been left unsaid, it is abundantly clear from the transcript that the trial judge generally allowed defendant to conduct his cross-examinations as he wished while still exercising the court’s authority to control the trial and avoid unnecessary waste of time. In doing so, the trial court merely redirected [him] so that defendant could still get to the point of his questioning without extraneous detours and repetition.” As to his “complaints about the judge’s conduct during voir dire, it is indisputably the sole duty and responsibility of the judge to instruct the jury on the law.” Next, as “to the judge’s comments to the jury venire that jury duty is a duty to fulfill even if a person does not want to fulfill it, the judge again merely provided a true statement of law.” Next, the court considered “defendant’s argument that the trial judge coerced the jury into reaching a hasty verdict by informing the jury that court would be adjourned for the weekend in approximately an hour, with deliberations to continue if necessary on Monday.” The court found that the “judge merely provided the jury with information about the schedule so jurors would know what to expect, while simultaneously indicating that the jury would have the time it needed to deliberate.” Also, the court found that the judge’s tone and demeanor did “not favor a conclusion that the veil of judicial impartiality was pierced.” Finally, none of the remaining Stevens factors favored “a finding that the veil of judicial impartiality was pierced.” Thus, the court concluded that defendant did not show “that the veil of judicial impartiality was pierced in this case because it is not reasonably likely that the judge’s conduct created the appearance of advocacy or partiality against defendant.” Affirmed.