Divorce; Attorney withdrawal; Adjudication of a settlement agreement’s validity without allowing a party an opportunity to retain a new attorney; Bye v Ferguson; Harmless error; Right to counsel; Const 1963, art 1, § 13; Haller v Haller; Mediated settlement agreements in domestic relations cases; MCR 3.216(H)(8); Reliance on MCR 2.507(G); Duress; Vittiglio v Vittiglio; Skaates v Kayser; Whether the judgment of divorce (JOD) adequately addressed the equitable distribution of the marital estate; MCR 3.211(B)(3); Request for a new judge; Kuebler v Kuebler

The court rejected plaintiff-ex-wife’s constitutional violation claim as to the opportunity to retain new counsel after her original attorney withdrew. While it found the trial court abused its discretion in entering the JOD without allowing her to acquire new counsel, it held that the error was harmless. It determined that her reliance on MCR 2.507(G) and related “case law to argue for the necessity of a signed written agreement for the settlement is erroneous as MCR 3.216(H)(8)” controlled here. It also rejected her duress claim. But it held that the trial court erred in not conducting “an evidentiary hearing to establish whether the settlement agreement—and subsequently, the [JOD]—fully adjudicated the marital estate.” Plaintiff appealed the JOD. “Considering established jurisprudence surrounding the right to counsel in divorce proceedings,” the court first determined that her constitutional claim was unfounded. She also argued “that the trial court erred by failing to afford her the opportunity to secure a new attorney after allowing her current attorney to withdraw.” The court concluded Bye indicated “that in light of plaintiff’s consistent requests for an adjournment to secure new legal representation and to address the potential issues of fraudulent activity and incomplete adjudication of the marital estate, the trial court’s decision to enter divorce judgment without allowing [her] to acquire new legal representation falls outside the bounds of reasonable judicial outcomes.” However, given that she “had the opportunity to obtain a new attorney prior to the [JOD’s] entry and subsequently received competent representation regarding her new claims, the trial court’s error was harmless.” Further, the record showed “plaintiff was not under duress at the time the settlement agreement was executed.” But the court found that the “trial court never made findings to ascertain whether the [JOD] aligned with the terms of the settlement, particularly in terms of disposition of all marital assets. Notably, the divorce judgment does not address disputed property items, such as” a home and a car. Thus, the court vacated the order denying plaintiff’s motion to set aside the JOD and directed the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. It denied her request for remand to a new judge. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.