Loss of evidence; Arizona v Youngblood; Other acts evidence; Prior sexual assaults; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Whether MCL 768.27a deprived defendant of due process; Prosecutorial misconduct; Hearsay; Sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE) testimony; MRE 803(4); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to the testimony from a sergeant & the SANE; Sentencing; Proportionality

The court held that defendant failed to show: (1) “his right to due process was violated when the trial court denied his motion to dismiss”; and (2) “the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to admit the testimony of the victim’s friends.” Also, it rejected his claim that MCL 768.27a deprived him of due process. As to prosecutorial misconduct, the court was “unconvinced that the outcome would have been different if [the officer in charge of the case] had not testified about defendant’s evasiveness.” As such, the trial court did not err when it permitted and failed to sua sponte strike the exchange. Further, he “failed to demonstrate that the outcome of the case would have otherwise been different had the SANE not recited the victim’s accusation.” Thus, he was not entitled to relief on the hearsay claim. Additionally, he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. Finally, the trial court’s 15 to 40 years sentence was not disproportionate or unreasonable for his CSC I convictions. He was convicted CSC I and II and sentenced to 15 to 40 years for each CSC I conviction and 5 to 15 years for each CSC II conviction. Defendant first contended, among other thing, that he was “entitled to have the charges against him dismissed because exculpatory evidence that was in the prosecution’s possession was destroyed. The evidence in question, data from the victim’s cellular telephone, was erased when a forensic analyst with the MSP was attempting to extract the data.” The court noted that the “trial court agreed with the prosecutor that the issue was whether the prosecutor failed to preserve evidence and not whether the prosecutor suppressed evidence.” Thus, the trial “court concluded that defendant had not established that the evidence was lost in bad faith.” The court agreed “that the appropriate standard is that under Youngblood.” It held that “the purported lack of evidence on the cellular telephone would, at best, be only ‘potentially exculpatory,’ depending on how the victim testified and how the jury viewed the evidence.” As to the other acts evidence, defendant had “not shown that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecutor to admit the testimony of the victim’s friends. While the testimony was undoubtedly prejudicial, it was not outside of the range of reasonable outcomes for the trial court to determine that the probative value of the other-acts testimony was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Also, the court rejected his claim “that MCL 768.27a deprived him of due process.” Because he “failed to establish any error, let alone plain error, he is not entitled to relief.” Affirmed.