Identification; Motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the rental vehicle; Late endorsement of the prosecution’s witness; Prejudice; Other acts evidence of defendant’s attempt to influence or intimidate the jury; MRE 404(b); Unfair prejudice

The court held that: (1) there was sufficient evidence to identify defendant-Holt as the perpetrator of the subject offenses, (2) the trial court properly denied his “motion to suppress the evidence recovered from his rental vehicle[,]" and (3) it did not abuse its discretion by “allowing the late endorsement of the prosecution’s witness” or by “granting the prosecution’s motion to admit the” other acts evidence. He was convicted of felony murder, armed robbery, and felony-firearm. As to identification, the court found “the evidence was sufficient to establish Holt’s identity as the person responsible for the armed robbery and shooting of decedent.” While he contended “that the prosecution failed to present any direct eyewitness identification testimony or forensic evidence indicating [he] was responsible for the underlying incident,” circumstantial evidence is adequate to establish identity. The court also held that any discrepancies as to his “appearance, the vehicle associated with fleeing the scene of the shooting, or the car rental entity’s records were issues solely for the jury to address.” Ultimately, it found “there was a plethora of circumstantial evidence to enable the trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Holt was the perpetrator of the subject offenses.” Holt next argued “that the evidence recovered from his rental car should be suppressed because it was the product of an unconstitutional search.” The record indicated Sergeant R “was lawfully near Holt’s rental vehicle, overseeing his apprehension, when [R] saw the firearm in plain view.” While Holt claimed the trial court “failed to consider whether law enforcement was legitimately present in the parking lot, which he claims was gated private property,” there was “no suggestion that the officers were required to bypass a gate or faced any obstacles in accessing the premises, despite the presence of numerous officers in the vicinity.” It further found that “Holt did not maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the parking lot considering it was a common area shared with other tenants, guests, and employees of the apartment complex, and the firearm was plainly visible through the front passenger window to any observer.” Moreover, in light of his “status a suspect in a firearm-related murder investigation, and the established connection between him and the rental vehicle, the presence of a firearm inside the car constituted incriminating evidence under the probable-cause standard.” And although he “was detained and unable to drive the rental vehicle, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement clearly permitted [R] to enter the vehicle.” Given that he “was suspected of killing a person with a firearm, the observation of a firearm inside the vehicle gives rise to probable cause to search the vehicle for evidence of the offense. The firearm was additionally in plain view, and as previously explained, subject to a warrantless seizure.” Affirmed.