Sufficiency of the evidence; First-degree murder; Premeditation & deliberation; Intent; AWIM; Aiding & abetting; Judicial disqualification; Admission of a gun; Sentencing; Alleged violation of the two-thirds rule; Scoring of OVs 14 & 19

In these consolidated appeals, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to (1) support defendant-Pruitt’s first-degree murder and AWIM convictions and (2) establish defendant-Bennett’s requisite intent for aiding and abetting first-degree murder and AWIM. Also, “under either the plain-error standard or a de novo standard, the trial judge did not err by denying defendants’ motion to disqualify herself.” Further, Pruitt failed to establish he was entitled to any relief as to the two-thirds rule. And as to Bennett, the trial court did not err by (1) admitting the gun into evidence and (2) assessing OVs 14 and 19 at 10 points each. First, defendants argued “that there was insufficient evidence to show Pruitt possessed the requisite intent to be convicted of first-degree murder. Notably, for both defendants, the prosecution had to prove that Pruitt committed first-degree premeditated murder.” The court held that there “was sufficient evidence to support Pruitt’s conviction.” The jury may “have inferred from the evidence that once Bennett instructed Pruitt to not let anyone out of the store, Pruitt formed the intent to kill if any of the ‘Joy Road Mob’ attempted to leave.” This was “supported by the evidence presented that immediately after Bennett states, ‘Don’t let no ni**a out that door, cuz!’ Pruitt moved to block the front doors, which typically serve as the store exit, and did so while reaching into his pocket, with his hand on his gun. In essence, the jury may have found [he] was ‘lying in wait’ for the next person who tried to leave the premises. The approximate 12 seconds between when Pruitt was instructed not let anyone out, at which point a jury could reasonably conclude he formed the initial intent to kill, and when [he] shot [victim-R] was sufficient to allow the jury to find that he acted with premeditation and deliberation.” There was also “sufficient evidence to substantiate the jury’s finding that Pruitt intended to kill [victim-Y].” His use of a firearm on Y, “by itself, is sufficient to support such a finding.” Also, the case did “not involve an allegation of an accidental shooting. After shooting [R] in the face while [he] was running toward Pruitt, Pruitt then aimed the gun down and deliberately shot [Y], who had tripped over the fallen [R], in the back. These circumstances permitted an inference of an intent” to kill. The court next found the “evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that Bennett intended the commission of the subject offenses. Given his instruction to Pruitt to bar anyone from leaving the premises, the jury could infer [he] was expressly intending for Pruitt to plan to shoot any person attempting to exit.” This was not mere speculation. “Bennett was aware that Pruitt was carrying a” firearm, “used a cane and had significant mobility issues resulting from a recent foot amputation. The jury could infer that, with this knowledge, Bennett recognized that the only means for Pruitt to stop persons from leaving the store was to shoot them with his gun.” This minimal circumstantial evidence was “sufficient to establish the requisite intent for aiding and abetting the offenses of first-degree murder and AWIM.” Affirmed.