Civil-commitment action; Order for involuntary mental-health treatment; Waiver of right to counsel; MCR 5.732(C); In re Londowski; Application of criminal self-representation standards in probate; In re EE; Competency to waive counsel when suffering from mental illness; People v Brooks; Requirements for waiver of counsel; People v Anderson; Mootness & public significance exception; In re Detmer/Beaudry; Law Enforcement Information Network (LEIN)

The court held that the probate court abused its discretion by allowing respondent, who claimed she was God and had attended law school “on another planet,” to waive counsel and represent herself in a mental-health commitment proceeding. Respondent’s court-appointed attorney reported she wished to represent herself, or alternatively have a male lawyer, and requested an adjournment. Despite psychiatrists diagnosing respondent with psychosis and delusions, the probate court permitted her to proceed pro se with standby counsel. The trial court subsequently ordered up to 60 days of inpatient treatment and up to 180 days of outpatient treatment. On appeal, the court emphasized that under MCR 5.732(C) a waiver must be “voluntarily and understandingly made,” and “[a] person who is the subject of a petition for involuntary mental-health treatment has a statutory right to be represented by counsel.” The court applied the standards for criminal self-representation in Anderson and EE, noting the requirement that waiver be unequivocal, knowing, and not disruptive. Here, the record showed respondent’s severe delusions and fixation on her name rendered her unable to knowingly and understandingly waive counsel. “Disorganized thinking, deficits in sustaining attention and concentration, impaired expressive abilities…can impair the defendant’s ability to play the significantly expanded role required for self-representation” The court found it eminently clear “that a person who verbalizes that she is God and went to law school on another planet…is not competent to waive her right to counsel.” It reversed and remanded, ordering the probate court to remove the expired commitment order from LEIN under MCL 333.1464a.