Sentencing; Scoring of OV 2; Lethal potential of a weapon used or possessed during the crime; MCL 777.32; Possession or use of an incendiary device, an explosive device, or a fully automatic weapon; MCL 777.32(1)(b); Possession or use of a knife; MCL 777.32(1)(d); Possession or use of a harmful chemical substance; MCL 777.32(1)(a); Scoring of OV 3; Life threatening or permanent incapacitating injury occurred to a victim; MCL 777.33(1)(c); People v Houston; Departure sentence; People v Walden; Reasonableness & proportionality; Mitigating factors

The court held that the trial court did not err in scoring OVs 2 and 3, and that defendant’s upward departure sentence was not unreasonable or disproportionate. She was convicted of second-degree murder for her role in brutally beating the victim and then burning his dead body. The trial court sentenced her to 40 to 60 years. On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the trial court erred in scoring OVs 2 and 3. As to OV 2, a “preponderance of the evidence . . . supported the conclusion that defendant used a ‘harmful chemical substance’ against the victim to murder him, and [she] has offered nothing to suggest otherwise.” As to OV 3, Houston “remains binding precedent, and defendant identifies . . . no reason why it would not dictate the outcome of [her] challenge here.” The court also rejected her claim that the trial court’s departure sentence was unreasonable and disproportionate. First, she “has shown no error in the [trial] court’s conclusion that [the OVs] failed to duly capture ‘the seriousness of the crime,’ such that an upward departure was warranted.” Second, the “nature of defendant’s prior record was already accounted for in the scoring of her guidelines and [she] has not explained how that accounting may not have been adequate.” Third, the trial court “adequately explained ‘why the sentence imposed is more proportionate to the offense and the offender than a different sentence would have been[.]’” Affirmed.