Tort claims arising from a report of suspected child abuse; Reasonable suspicion of child abuse; Alleged retaliatory reporting; Immediate reporting; MCL 722.623(1)(a); MCL 722.625; Child Protection Law (CPL)

The court held that appellants “have not shown, through their allegations or otherwise, a viable basis to conclude that [defendant-doctor] lacked even a reasonable suspicion for her concerns of abuse under the circumstances presented by this case, such that the presumption of her good faith in reporting those concerns would be overcome and her immunity for doing so would be stripped.” Nor did it see “a question of fact whose further development could provide that basis.” It also held that “assuming Doctor did not report ‘immediate[ly]’ as required by MCL 722.623(1)(a), that did not render immunity under MCL 722.625 inapplicable in this case.” The court first addressed “appellants’ claim that Doctor acted in bad faith when she made the report to CPS because the report was motivated by personal animosity toward” plaintiff-Mother. Appellants argued “that Doctor filed the CPS report not due to any reasonable suspicion of child abuse, but in retaliation for Mother’s threat to report Doctor’s conduct to Doctor’s supervisor, and because Mother generally refused to follow Doctor’s medical advice. According to appellants’ version of events, Doctor made the report shortly after a particularly contentious phone call with Mother regarding Doe’s (plaintiff’s child) care, followed by Mother informing Doctor’s coworker that she intended to file a formal complaint about Doctor.” The court held that even “accepting appellants’ version of events as true, they do not show that Doctor acted in bad faith such that she would not be entitled to immunity under the CPL for her report.” It found that as “to reasonable suspicion, there is no meaningful dispute that Doctor had significant concerns about Doe’s prior diagnoses and medication regimen, which Doctor assessed to be misguided and unduly dangerous for Doe.” And, as appellants claimed “in their complaint, Doctor’s report came on the heels of a contentious conversation between Mother and Doctor about these concerns, in which Mother insisted that any change ‘was completely out of the question’ while ultimately agreeing to only one ‘potential[]’ dosage adjustment of one of the medications. Appellants strongly disagree with Doctor’s concerns regarding Doe’s treatment and Mother’s role in it. But they do not contest that those collective concerns, if they were correct as reported, would require mandatory reporting under the CPL—and thus that Doctor would face civil and criminal liability for not reporting them.” And while appellants contended “Doctor’s concerns were wrong and impugn her judgment as to them, those criticisms go beyond what reasonable suspicion requires or entails, and do not themselves betray a lack of good faith in Doctor’s reporting.”