Child custody; Established custodial environment (ECE); MCL 722.27(1)(c); Sabatine v Sabatine; Legal custody; Child’s best interests; MCL 722.23; Wright v Wright; Proper cause & change of circumstances; Vodvarka v Grasmeyer; Imputation of income under the Michigan Child Support Formula (MCSF); 2021 MCSF 2.01(G); Carlson v Carlson; Attorney fees in domestic relations case; MCR 3.206(D)(2); Reed v Reed; Friend of the Court (FOC)

The court held that the record supported an ECE with defendant-mother and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding her sole legal custody. But the trial court erred by imputing business income to plaintiff-father without making the findings required by the MCSF and remand was required as to the award of attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D)(2). The parties separated when the child was three months old. An interim order left physical custody with defendant and plaintiff had set parenting time. Disputes followed over legal custody, plaintiff’s income, and fees. After trial, the trial court found an ECE with defendant, weighed the best interest factors largely in her favor, awarded her sole legal and physical custody, set parenting time for plaintiff, referred support to the FOC, imputed business income to plaintiff, and awarded defendant fees. On appeal, the court first held that the record supported the ECE with defendant and if “the trial court were to grant plaintiff’s request to give the parties equal parenting time, then the change would alter” the child’s ECE “because it would change to whom [the child] would look on a daily basis for parental guidance, comfort, and the necessities of life.” Further, while the trial court mistakenly declined to address the permanence factor and may have erred in weighing moral fitness heavily for defendant, awarding sole legal custody was within the range of principled outcomes given the parties’ inability to cooperate. “The trial court weighed several of the best-interest factors in favor of defendant, and the record clearly demonstrated that the parties struggled to coparent and could not agree on many issues regarding” the child’s well-being. The court next held that plaintiff failed to show “the trial court abused its discretion by limiting counsel’s questioning of defendant” about her income “or deprived [him] of due process by doing so.” Turning to support, the court vacated the imputation of income to plaintiff because the trial court “imputed this income without first considering all of the factors in the MCSF or Michigan caselaw.” Finally, as to fees, the court vacated the award and directed the trial court on remand to “clarify whether the $15,000 attorney-fee award is on the basis of MCR 3.206(D)(2)(a) or (b). If (a), then [it] must specify that the award is made on the basis of defendant’s inability to bear the expense of the action and plaintiff’s ability to pay. . . . If (b), then [it] must specify how defendant demonstrated that the particular attorney fees and expenses were incurred due to plaintiff’s refusal to comply with a previous court order.” Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.