Motion for a mistrial; Brady violation; Brady v Maryland; Hearsay; Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b)(1); Relevance; MRE 401; Other domestic assaults; MCL 768.27b; Notice; MCL 768.27b(2); Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to the testimony referencing incarceration; Detective’s testimony describing a victim’s demeanor; Victims’ mother’s testimony about prior domestic violence; Cumulative error; Sentencing; Lifetime SORA registration; Cruel or unusual punishment; Lifetime electronic monitoring (LEM); Unreasonable search; People v Hallak; Judgment of sentence (JOS)

The court held that: (1) “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a mistrial”; (2) he failed to establish a Brady violation or show he was prejudiced by a detective’s hearsay testimony; (3) his other acts evidence argument as to notice failed; (4) he failed to show the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value of the other acts of domestic violence; (5) his ineffective assistance of counsel claim failed; (6) the cumulative effect of two errors did not warrant a new trial; (7) “his cruel-or-unusual-punishment” claim was meritless; and (8) consistent “with Hallak, the requirement that defendant submit to” LEM was not unconstitutional. Thus, the court affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences but remanded for the ministerial task of correcting the JOS to reflect the imposition of LEM. He was convicted of CSC I and II and sentenced to 25 to 40 years for the former and 10 to 15 for the latter. He first claimed “that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial after the victims’ mother referenced his prior incarceration during her testimony.” He contended this reference “was highly prejudicial and that the trial court’s curative instruction was insufficient to remedy the harm.” The court held that the reference to his “previous incarceration was improper.” But it found that the “prosecutor’s question—when the witness and defendant started dating—did not call for testimony regarding defendant’s prior incarceration, rendering the response unresponsive to the question posed. There is no evidence that the prosecutor intentionally elicited or emphasized the improper testimony. Moreover, the trial court struck the improper testimony and instructed the jury not to consider it.” The court was “not persuaded that the prejudicial effect of a single reference to defendant’s prior incarceration was so significant that it could not be cured by the trial court’s instruction.” Next, he claimed that he was “entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor failed to timely disclose evidence favorable to the defense in violation of Brady[.]” The court held that assuming “for the sake of argument that the prosecution’s disclosure was untimely and satisfied the first prong of the Brady analysis, defendant is not entitled to a new trial because he has not met the second and third prongs.” As to the second prong, he had “not shown that the evidence was favorable to him.” Regarding the third prong, he had not shown “that the evidence was material.” Also, the late disclosures “did not preclude defendant from cross-examining the victims’ mother regarding the cameras.” His remaining arguments were meritless.