Termination of parental rights; Jurisdiction over the child; Reasonable reunification efforts; Finding of aggravated circumstances; Prior abuse; MCL 722.638(1)(a); The doctrine of anticipatory neglect

The court held that the trial court did not clearly err in exercising jurisdiction over child-KV. “Its aggravated circumstances finding under MCL 722.638(1)(a), however, was erroneous as a matter of law. Aggravated circumstances exist under that statute only if a parent has abused the child or the child’s sibling; a finding of anticipatory abuse is insufficient. Because the trial court did not find that respondent[-father] abused either KV or a sibling of KV, DHHS was required to make reasonable efforts to reunify respondent with KV before seeking termination.” Thus, it affirmed the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction, reversed its finding of aggravated circumstances, vacated the order terminating respondent’s parental rights, and remanded. As to jurisdiction, the transcript clarified that the trial “court found by a preponderance that respondent assaulted [KV's stepsister, CG] and that, as a result, it was taking jurisdiction over KV. The [trial] court later added that jurisdiction rested on respondent’s ‘failure to protect against the molestation by the male children in the home.’” Its findings turned on the trial “court’s assessment of CG’s credibility, and ‘[i]t is not for this Court to displace the trial court’s credibility determination.’” The court found that taken “together, the findings establish jurisdiction under at least MCL 712A.2(b)(2), which authorizes jurisdiction when a parent’s ‘neglect, . . . criminality, . . . or depravity’ renders the home ‘an unfit place for the juvenile to live in.’” The trial “court’s oral ruling also adequately communicated finality, as there is no dispute that it held that it had jurisdiction over KV and proceeded to the disposition phase.” The court concluded that the “trial court’s findings are not clearly erroneous, so we affirm its exercise of jurisdiction over KV.” As to aggravated circumstances, DHHS urged the trial “court to apply the doctrine of anticipatory neglect (or anticipatory abuse), and the [trial] court relied on that doctrine in finding aggravated circumstances.” The court concluded “that the statute does not permit that approach.” The court noted that MCL 722.638(1)(a) “recognizes only a narrow form of anticipatory abuse: it permits an inference that a parent who abuses a child’s sibling may also abuse that child. But when the children are not siblings, the statute does not permit extending that inference.” Moreover, as respondent pointed “out, the statute requires that the prior act of abuse be directed at either the child for whom termination is sought or that child’s sibling.” The court noted that the “trial court did not find that respondent abused KV, and neither party challenges its holding that CG is not KV’s sibling. The only abuse identified in the record— that of CG—therefore cannot satisfy MCL 722.638(1)(a) with respect to KV. To hold otherwise would improperly extend the statute beyond its terms.”