Legal malpractice; Alleged violation of the “Ku Klux Klan Act”; 42 USC § 1983; Failure to allege defendant acted under color of state law; § 1985(3) (intent to deprive of equal protection or equal privileges & immunities); Griffin v Breckenridge; Conspiracy

The court held that plaintiff failed to plead an actionable claim under § 1985(3), so the trial court properly granted defendant-law firm summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8). Also, it found that “even accepting all of the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint as true, [his] amended complaint failed to state a claim of legal malpractice,” making summary disposition of this claim proper as well. Plaintiff was represented by defendant in a criminal case. He later filed the complaint in this case “in which he alleged that defendant’s conduct while representing [him] violated the ‘Ku Klux Klan Act,’ and that defendant committed legal malpractice.” On appeal, the court first found that based on the claims in his complaint, it was “apparent that plaintiff intended to bring a cause of action not under” § 1983 but under § 1985(3). It concluded that while “the amended complaint mentions race, it merely alleges that defendant,” the prosecutor in the criminal case, and a judge in that case (Judge Giovan) “are white, and plaintiff is black. Nowhere does the amended complaint allege a racial animus behind the alleged conspirators’ actions. Without such allegations, there is no amount of factual development that could justify recovery under” § 1985(3) and thus, the amended complaint failed to state a claim under the statute. In addition, it failed “to sufficiently allege the existence of a conspiracy.” Further, it failed “to allege an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, which is required to state a claim under” § 1985(3). The complaint “merely makes conclusory legal assertions, unsupported by allegations of fact, to support his claim that the prosecutor and defendant conspired to deprive [him] of the new trial to which he was entitled.” This was insufficient “‘to state a cause of action.’” As to his legal malpractice claim, the amended complaint did “not allege that defendant agreed with” the relief granted in the criminal case (an evidentiary hearing). Rather, “the complaint alleges that Judge Giovan used (and, in plaintiff’s telling, abused) his discretion when making this ruling.” Further, his amended complaint did not “explain how plaintiff’s being at” a 7/27/22 “hearing, or how defendant not saying what he did at the hearing, would have resulted in Judge Giovan ordering a new trial instead of an evidentiary hearing. Plaintiff does not identify any argument that he or defendant could have made—or any other action either of them could have taken—that would have likely resulted in a different outcome.” He instead alleged, “in conclusory fashion, that if he had been present at the [7/27/22] hearing and defendant had not made the arguments that he did, then plaintiff would have been granted a new trial.” This was again insufficient. Affirmed.