Scope of the “reasonable & good faith belief” requirement of a Title VII retaliation claim; Title VII’s opposition clause; Wasek v Arrow Energy Servs, Inc; Montell v Diversified Clinical Servs, Inc; Admission of evidence of plaintiff’s sexual history & preferences; Applicability of FRE 412; Exception to Rule 412 for civil cases (FRE 412(b)(2)); Morristown-Hamblen Hospital Association (MHHA)

The court held that the “district court correctly interpreted Title VII’s retaliation provision to include inquiry into [plaintiff-]Graf’s reasonable and good-faith belief that she had been subjected to unwanted sexual conduct.” Further, the district court did not err in admitting limited “evidence of her sexual history and predisposition.” Thus, the court affirmed the jury verdict for defendant-former employer (MHHA, a hospital) on her Title VII retaliation claim. Plaintiff asserted that “during a lunch break and on hospital grounds, one of the hospital’s security guards” (nonparty-O] raped her. Following a limited investigation into her complaint, an MHHA “HR representative determined that the sexual interaction between Graf and [O] had been consensual. Shortly thereafter, MHHA terminated Graf on the grounds that she had violated” its policies. On appeal, she first argued that the district court misinterpreted Title VII and the court’s case law in ruling “that an individual’s belief in the veracity of their underlying sexual-assault claim is an essential element of a Title VII retaliation claim.” The court disagreed. Reviewing its case precedent, it concluded “Graf did not need to prove to the jury that the conduct she reported to [O’s] supervisor, and eventually to an HR representative, was, as a legal matter, a rape. But Graf was required to demonstrate her reasonable and good-faith belief that [O’s] conduct violated Title VII. And MHHA was entitled to introduce evidence rebutting Graf’s alleged good-faith belief in the purported violative conduct she had reported, including evidence that [she] had consented to the sexual encounter, because such evidence was directly relevant to the reasonableness of Graf’s belief in whether Title VII prohibits that conduct.” While the court found that the district court “did not err as a matter of statutory interpretation[,]” it cautioned that, to be relevant, evidence that a “complainant believed the alleged sexual misconduct was consensual . . . must be narrowly tailored to the complainant’s own belief in the consensual or nonconsensual nature of the alleged misconduct.” Turning to plaintiff’s evidentiary argument, the court held that “the district court committed no reversible error in admitting certain categories of evidence falling outside of the scope of Rule 412.”