Petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 USC § 2241; Whether First Step Act (FSA) credits can reduce a petitioner’s supervised release term; 18 USC § 3632(d)(4)(C) & § 3624(g); Guerriero v Miami RRM (Unpub 11th Cir); “In custody” on supervised release; In re Stansell; Bureau of Prisons (BOP)

Addressing an issue of first impression, the court held that because FSA time credits can shorten only a prisoner’s incarceration, not a term of supervised release, petitioner-Hargrove’s release to supervision mooted his § 2241 petition. Hargrove claimed the BOP wrongly denied him FSA credits. He was released from custody to supervised release while the case was pending on appeal. The court first rejected the government’s threshold “custody” argument, noting the Sixth Circuit has “consistently found that ‘individuals subject to supervised release in the federal system[] satisfy the “in custody” requirement’ to bring a habeas claim.” However, it found the dispute was moot because credits cannot reduce supervised release. Reading § 3632(d)(4)(C) with § 3624(g), the court explained that credits are applied “toward time in prerelease custody or supervised release” by enabling the BOP to transfer an eligible prisoner to begin supervision earlier, not by reducing the supervision term itself. It concluded that FSA credits cannot be used to reduce a supervised-release term, and when a prisoner earns credits “toward” supervised release, he moves “in the direction” of supervised release. The court aligned with the 11th Circuit’s view that credits “reduce a prisoner’s incarceration time” rather than supervised release time. Because Hargrove was already on supervision, any ruling on credits would not afford “effectual relief,” so the case was moot. Dismissed.