Whether a charge under 18 USC § 2421 (transportation of an individual to engage in criminal sexual activity) was time-barred; Applicability of § 3282(a) or § 3283; United States v Noveck; Applicability of a “categorical approach”; “Sexual activity” & “sexual abuse”; Sufficiency of the indictment; Exploitation of a child (§ 2251(a)); Sufficiency of the evidence; Intent; The jurisdictional element of § 2251; Whether photos & videos constituted “sexually explicit conduct” (§ 2256(2)(A)(i)–(v)); Possession of child pornography (§ 2252A); “Material”; Committing sexual exploitation of a child while a registered sex offender (§ 2260A); Sentencing; Enhancement based on prior state convictions; § 2251(e); “Child” & “minor”

The court held that: (1) defendant-Deakins’s charge for violating § 2421 was not time-barred; (2) the indictment sufficiently alleged this count as well as counts for exploitation of a child; (3) the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions on all five charged counts; and (4) the district court did not err in applying a sentencing enhancement based on his prior state convictions. The case arose from defendant’s sexual abuse of three boys. He was convicted of transportation of an individual to engage in criminal sexual activity, exploitation of a child, possession of child pornography, and committing sexual exploitation of a child while a registered sex offender. He first argued that the count for violating § 2421 was time-barred by “§ 3282(a), which imposes a five-year default statute of limitations on non-capital federal crimes.” The government argued that instead, limitations § 3283 governed. This “displaces § 3282(a)’s five-year default when the offense is one ‘involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnaping, of a child under the age of 18.’” The primary support for defendant’s argument was a 1926 Supreme Court decision, Noveck. The court noted that it knew “of no case in the last three-quarters of a century in which the Court has applied something like a ‘categorical approach’ to determine the correct statute of limitations.” However, it concluded that, even assuming Noveck’s approach applied, Deakins’s argument failed. “Noveck held that perjury was not an offense ‘involving the defrauding or attempts to defraud the United States’ because ‘the alleged purpose to defraud the United States [was] not an element of the crime . . . on which the indictment [was] based.’ . . . Here, by contrast, intended sexual abuse is a necessary ingredient of the trafficking charge. So, even if Noveck’s approach applies here, Deakins’s offense was one ‘involving’ child ‘sexual . . . abuse.’” As a result, § “3283 applies, and the government’s charging of Count One was timely.” As to his indictment challenges, “Count One was constitutionally sufficient. It tracked the language of § 2421 and listed each element.” Further, it gave factual details on when (11/98 to 6/20), “where (Tennessee and elsewhere), and against whom (C.C.) the offense was committed. Those details were sufficient to ‘inform the accused of the specific offense.’” The child exploitation counts (Two and Three) “tracked the statutory language verbatim, which is generally sufficient.” In addition, “the indictment included factual details regarding when (2006 to 2007; [6 to 9/2018]), where (Tennessee), and against whom (B.A.; J.G.) the offenses were committed. Thus, [it] in fact described ‘a particular criminal act’ rather than merely ‘a type of crime.’” Affirmed.