“Right of access”; 2000 Baum Family Trust v Babel, The Driveway Act; MCL 247.324; Smith v Edwards; Quiet title; Adverse possession; Acquiescence; Nuisance per se; Trespass

The court held that under “the circumstances, the trial court did not err by examining the competing burdens on the parties and ruling that the driveway did not interfere unlawfully with plaintiffs’ access to” the road (Cantley Road) or other property rights. Also, the trial court did not err by ruling for defendants on plaintiffs’ adverse possession, acquiescence, and nuisance per se claims or on defendants’ trespass counterclaim. The case involved “defendants’ installation of a concrete driveway, which plaintiffs argue encroached on their property, crossed over about 40% of their property frontage, and went into the public road.” Plaintiffs own lakefront property on the road, which they purchased in 6/92. Defendants own an adjacent property, which they purchased in 2000. Plaintiffs first argued “that the trial court erred by failing to recognize that defendants’ driveway encroached on their rights to” the road. They contended “that the trial court erred by examining the degree of the burden that the driveway placed on plaintiffs instead of simply examining whether an encroachment existed at all.” The central issue was whether plaintiffs’ rights to “the reversionary interest to the center of the public” road and to access their home from the road “supersede defendants’ right to reasonable and convenient access to their property from the public road.” As it related “to plaintiffs’ right to access their property from the public road, plaintiffs do not cite any law that grants them a complete right of access to Cantley Road along their entire frontage without any exception.” Rather, the court noted “there is a right to access the road—not a right to a completely unobstructed frontage.” There was “no dispute that plaintiffs have an unobstructed access point to Cantley Road through their own driveway.” The court held that “like the situation in Smith, there was no evidence that the driveway interfered with plaintiffs’ rights to access the public road, considering that [they] had access to the road and could not expand on that access by building a second (or circular) driveway on their property.” The trial court did not err by holding “that the driveway did not interfere with plaintiffs’ right to access the street.” Further, considering the “facts, the trial court did not err by concluding that the driveway was necessary to allow defendants reasonable access to their property from the public road. To the extent that the driveway interfered with plaintiffs’ reversionary interest to the center of the road, the [trial] court did not err by finding that this interest was outweighed by defendants’ competing interest in reasonable access to their property.” Affirmed.