Sentencing for a conviction under 18 USC § 2251(a) for conspiracy to sexually exploit a minor; Enhancement under § 2251(e) for two prior convictions related to sexual exploitation of a minor; Whether defendant’s prior offenses resulted in “convictions” or “juvenile adjudications”; Whether federal or state law was determinative; Whether receiving enhancements under both § 2251(e) & § 2260A (committing the crimes while registered as a sex offender) violated “double jeopardy” protections; Applicability of Blockburger v United States; “Propensity evidence” under FRE 413

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court upheld a sentencing enhancement under § 2251(e) for defendant-Baker’s two prior convictions related to sexually exploiting minors. It rejected his arguments that (1) they were “juvenile adjudications” and not “convictions,” and (2) enhancements under both § 2251(e) and § 2260A violated his double jeopardy rights. It also upheld the admission of challenged testimony under FRE 413. Baker was convicted of conspiracy to sexually exploit a minor, coercion and enticement of a minor, and committing the offenses while being required to register as a sex offender. He had two prior convictions relating to the sexual exploitation of minors, making the 35-year minimum under § 2251(e) for violating § 2251(a) applicable. The first issue was whether Baker had at least two prior sexual-exploitation-of-children “conviction[s.]” He claimed his two 1997 Michigan CSC offenses were only juvenile adjudications and not convictions. The court first determined that federal, not state law, is used to define what constitutes a conviction (but it noted the result would have been the same under Michigan law). As to what the term means, it noted that even guilty pleas can constitute convictions. While Baker was a juvenile when he was charged with CSC, the Judgment of Conviction entered on his guilty plea provided that “‘the case was designated by that prosecutor for trial of the juvenile in the same manner as an adult.’” There was no indication that he was subject to a juvenile adjudication. Instead, the state records “reflect that Baker was convicted of [CSC] rather than adjudicated responsible.” As to his double jeopardy argument related to being subject to a 10-year enhancement under § 2260A for committing the crimes while being a registered sex offender, the court declined to apply Blockburger and found that “Congress enacted § 2260A knowing that § 2251 already included a penalty enhancement for individuals with prior convictions for sexually exploiting minors. This shows that [it] intended to impose cumulative punishment on persons already subject to the § 2251(e) enhancement when it passed § 2260A.” Lastly, as to the evidence admitted under FRE 413, the court explained that Rule 413(a) provides that when a defendant is accused of sexual assault in a criminal case, “‘the court may admit evidence that the defendant committed any other sexual assault. The evidence may be considered on any matter to which it is relevant.’” His assertion that he was not accused of sexual assault here failed given “Rule 413’s broad definition of ‘sexual assault,’” and the court held that the prior assaults “clear the ‘very low’ threshold of similarity to Baker’s charged offense conduct.” Affirmed.