Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b); Relevance; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; MCL 768.27b(1); Motion for an adjournment; Prejudice; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to move for a mistrial after complainant’s testimony; People v Horton; People v Serges

The court concluded that (1) the trial court did not err in admitting other acts evidence as to defendant-Peyerk’s conduct toward the complainant’s mother, (2) Peyerk did not show “that he was prejudiced by the trial court’s denial of his request for adjournment on the basis of the production of pertinent medical records[,]” and (3) he was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. Thus, it affirmed his convictions of CSC III and CSC IV. The court noted that for the first prong of the applicable test, “the prosecution contended, during the lower court proceedings, that the other-acts evidence was being offered to prove a plan, scheme, or system of behavior, which is a proper purpose listed under MRE 404(b)(1).” Concerning the second prong, it found that the trial court properly held that the challenged “testimony was similar enough to the charged conduct in this case ‘to support an inference that they are manifestations of a common plan, scheme, or system.’” The court determined that it was “evident that the alleged sexual assault of complainant’s mother was similar to the charged conduct in this case, and amounted to more than ‘a series of similar spontaneous acts . . . .’” As to the third prong, it held “that the trial court’s decision to allow evidence of Peyerk’s other acts did not unfairly prejudice Peyerk at trial.” The court determined that “the danger of unfair prejudice caused by the other-acts evidence did not ‘substantially outweigh’ its significant probative value; thus, the evidence was not excludable under MRE 403.” As to the final prong, the court noted that “the trial court provided a limiting instruction regarding how the evidence was to be used by the jury.” Finally, it concluded that “even if the trial court had erred in its original admission of evidence, Peyerk’s arguments concerning MRE 404(b) appear to be harmless because the contested evidence was admissible under MCL 768.27b(1).”