Excessive force claim under 42 USC § 1983; Graham v Connor; Qualified immunity; Estate of Hill ex rel Hill v Miracle; Whether “tasing” an individual in a mental-health crisis violated her Fourth Amendment rights; Whether an officer violated the individual’s Fourth Amendment rights by shooting her just seconds after she was tased; Palma v Johns; Whether the constitutional rights were clearly established at the time of the incident; Municipal liability under Monell v Department of Soc Servs of City of NY

The court reversed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to defendants-police officers (Williams and Lopez) as to the tasing and shooting of an individual (Wooden) who was having a mental-health emergency. It concluded that plaintiff-Chrestman plausibly alleged that they violated Wooden’s clearly established constitutional rights. It also vacated the dismissal of the municipal liability claim. Plaintiff, next friend to Wooden, alleged excessive force claims based on Wooden being tased, shot, and severely injured. “Wooden, in the throes of a mental-health crisis, called 911 and asked for police to kill her.” When they arrived at the scene, she was holding a bat and a pickax. Within 10 minutes, Williams tased her and, as Wooden approached the officers, Lopez shot her, hitting her twice. On appeal, the court explained that, under Hill, in cases involving mental-health-emergencies, factors in determining “the ‘reasonableness of police force’” under the totality of the circumstances include whether (1) the medical emergency made the individual incapable of making a “rational decision” in ways that created the threat of immediate serious harm to the individual or to others, (2) it was reasonably necessary to use some degree of force to counter the threat, and (3) the force used was excessive under the circumstances. The court held that plaintiff plasuibly alleged that “Willaims violated Wooden's constitutional rights when he tased her.” Wooden was mentally unstable, not committing a crime, and was not under arrest or resisting arrest. Further, she posed no immediate threat, and plaintiff offered evidence that the tasing was “excessive. No other officer on the scene used force against Wooden at that time. Williams would later explain that he tased Wooden after he ‘gave up.’” The court noted that “absent an officer’s reasonable fear for his safety, simple disobedience by an individual not under arrest does not justify tasing.” It rejected Williams’s argument that video cam footage blatantly contradicted plaintiff’s allegations. As for Lopez’s shooting Wooden seconds later, applying the Palma factors, the court held that plaintiff plausibly alleged that Lopez violated Wooden’s Fourth Amendment rights when he shot her. The court then held that, based on the complaint’s allegations that “Wooden was: (1) not under arrest, (2) not resisting arrest, (3) suffering a mental-health crisis, and (4) nonviolent[,]” the constitutional right not to be tased or shot was clearly established at the time. And because it held that plaintiff “plausibly alleged that Williams and Lopez violated Wooden’s clearly established rights,” the court also revived the municipal liability claim. Remanded.