Removal & temporary custody; MCL 712A.13a(9); MCR 3.965; In re Benavides; Petition authorization & probable cause; MCL 712A.2(b); MCR 3.965(B)(12); In re Ferranti; Standard of proof when asserting jurisdiction; In re Williams; Reasonable efforts to prevent removal; MCL 712A.13a(9)(d), MCR 3.965(C)(4); In re Sanborn; Risk to siblings based on abuse of one child; In re Christie; Abandonment of appellate issue; In re Rippy

The court affirmed the orders removing the children from respondent-mother’s care and limiting her to supervised parenting time because the record supported the trial court’s contrary-to-welfare and reasonable-efforts findings under MCL 712A.13a(9), and the challenge to supervised parenting time was abandoned. Respondent is the mother of three children with different fathers. The DHHS petitioned after reports that she physically abused KILW, hitting her, pushing her into a washer/dryer, choking her, pulling her shirt over her head, biting her finger and elbow, and breaking her finger, while holding SDM. Medical providers diagnosed nonaccidental trauma. The court placed KILW with her nonrespondent father and, after their grandmother’s death, placed SDM and DKMM in foster care. It later ordered respondent to have supervised parenting time. The trial court granted removal, expressly finding it contrary to the children’s welfare to remain with respondent and that reasonable efforts were made. On appeal, the court rejected respondent’s argument that the statutory criteria for removal were not met, noting that “the trial court explicitly stated that it was contrary to the children’s welfare to remain in respondent’s care and that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent removal.” Addressing the risk to SDM and DKMM, the court emphasized that “treatment of one child is probative of how a respondent may treat their other children,” and the trial court did not err by finding all three children at risk given the nonaccidental trauma to KILW. The court also rejected respondent’s claim that reasonable efforts were lacking, noting no argument was made “as to why these efforts were inadequate and what should have been done instead.” Finally, the court declined to disturb the supervised-visitation order because respondent made “no argument as to why she should be allowed unsupervised parenting time,” and thus, abandoned it.